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The People's Republic of China

September, 1991

Our September issue discusses China's domestic and foreign policies in the second year after the pro-democracy movement's suppression. Topics include:

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China's Economy
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Youth in China
by BEVERLY HOOPER, Murdoch University

Hong Kong and China
by WILLIAM OVERHOLT, Bankers Trust, Hong Kong

Science and Technology in China
by RICHARD SUTTMEIER, University of Oregon

In May, Carol L. Thompson steps down as editor of *Current History* after 49 years with the magazine — 36 years as editor. Executive editor William W. Finan Jr. succeeds her as editor.

This issue also marks the retirement of Elbert P. Thompson as vice president of Current History, Inc.

The staff of *Current History* offers best wishes and appreciation of the role the Thompsons have played in the magazine's development.

While attention in recent months has focused on the Persian Gulf, Africa has undergone changes that have attracted less notice. Two of the remaining Marxist regimes, in Ethiopia and Mozambique, have turned to market economics; South Africa continues to dismantle apartheid; and Nigeria is approaching its self-proclaimed deadline for democracy. In spite of these events and the continuing problems of political instability and economic chaos elsewhere in Africa, the United States has neglected the continent. As the author of our introductory article states, "While there is a growing recognition in Washington that Africans cannot solve their problems themselves, there is a lack of consensus as to how the United States can best help and to what extent it must help financially. The [United States] also seems to believe that problems in Africa . . . do not threaten world security and peace."

The Challenge to the United States in Africa

BY RICHARD W. HULL

Professor of African History, New York University

THE United States is quietly disengaging from sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1983, it has accelerated the pace of disinvestment. Bilateral trade has fallen off appreciably, except with oil-producing countries. The United States is purchasing fewer nonpetroleum African imports and is exporting fewer capital goods to Africa. And even when petroleum imports have dramatically increased, as in the case of Nigeria, the United States has failed to increase exports substantially.

In South Africa more than 210 firms—some of which set up operations in the nineteenth century—have pulled up stakes. Disinvestment is most evident in Kenya, where Pepsico, Firestone, Union Carbide, the First National Bank of Chicago and more than a dozen other companies have pulled out. Pan American World Airways has abandoned its flights to western and southern Africa, and now flies only to Nairobi. With the exception of Kenya, sub-Saharan Africa is no longer serviced by an American carrier and travelers must fly through Europe or fall back on a few African carriers that offer limited and often unreliable service.

Investment in mining and manufacturing by American companies has been almost nil for the past decade. Foreign exchange constraints, bureaucratic red tape at seaports and air terminals, and

delays in profit remittance are the main reasons. Most countries lack the foreign exchange that companies require to import the machinery needed to maintain operational capacity and ensure profits.

In an effort to encourage American corporations to invest in Africa, in 1990 the United States initiated a $30-million "Africa Growth Fund."[1] In 1988 the United States played a major role in establishing the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency (MIGA) as a World Bank affiliate (MIGA encourages the flow of direct investment capital to underdeveloped countries). The response by American business to both initiatives has been discouraging. This is unfortunate. Not since the era of independence three decades earlier have African countries been so eager for American trade and investment. And not since the beginning of the colonial era nearly a century ago have these countries undergone such a fundamental restructuring of their economies and been so receptive to American participation.

Since the mid-1980's, nearly every African country, including those that are nominally Marxist, has scrapped its anticapitalist policies. Socialist models proved to be expensive and administratively unworkable. Moreover, the failing socialist countries of Europe, particularly the Soviet Union, could no longer support their African aid programs. Their withdrawal has created a vacuum that none of the

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[1] C.L. Morna, "Enticing Investment," *Africa Report,* January–February, 1991, p. 24.

leading capitalist countries, with the possible exception of Japan, seems inclined to fill. Consequently, the United States is losing a historic opportunity to help move Africa toward a free enterprise path that could bring enormous long-term benefits for both the United States and Africa.

Ironically, American disengagement comes when African countries have taken bold steps to liberalize their economies. Most have either accepted the market-oriented economic reform programs demanded by the United States and formulated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or they have imposed their own. They have liberalized their trade policies and have put much more effort into promoting export-oriented growth. In addition, most have devalued their currencies and drastically reduced state subsidies and price controls. African governments have also launched sweeping privatization programs aimed at selling state corporations, or parastatals, to both foreign and domestic private investors. Even nominally Marxist countries like Zimbabwe have implemented new investment codes that are extremely favorable to foreign investors.

The United States has tried, with only limited success, to expand bilateral trade and investment in Africa. The United States Agency for International Development (AID) has established a Bureau for Private Enterprise that works closely with the African Development Bank (ADB) to establish bridges to African entrepreneurs. In March, 1990, the ADB brought 31 prominent African businesspeople to the United States to meet American businesspeople as well as key members of the United States Congress and President George Bush. The businesspeople were well received in Dallas, Atlanta, New York and elsewhere, but little business was actually generated.

Unfortunately, the Bush administration has been reluctant to increase financial assistance because it is preoccupied with the domestic economy and events in the Persian Gulf. The administration has spurned a United Nations proposal that developed nations contribute 0.15 percent of their gross national product (GNP) in official aid to less developed countries. However, over the past year, President Bush has seemed genuinely concerned about Africa and has received more African heads of state than any of his Republican predecessors. But warm hospitality and a firm handshake cannot solve Africa's problems. Indeed, they only raise unrealistic expectations.

Congress, characteristically at odds with the President on African issues, appears to be more acutely aware of the need to aid Africa. In November, 1990, it raised aid to Africa to about $800 million, which was more than 40 percent over the $560 million suggested by the President. Nevertheless, the amount is paltry when compared with $2.3 billion in United States aid for Egypt and $3 billion in economic and military assistance for Israel.

FEARS, FATIGUE AND UNCERTAINTIES

Why has American private enterprise not risen to the challenge? The recession and the crisis in the Persian Gulf are part of the answer. But running deeper are the currents of fear, uncertainty and ennui felt by American businesspeople when confronted with Africa. Corporate America remains largely ignorant of Africa and its potential. Its knowledge of the continent barely extends beyond what appears in the popular media, which is usually distorted and laden with stereotypes. Rarely does corporate America have contact with American specialists on Africa, who are well informed on African issues and who could act as bridge builders.

Donor fatigue has also reached epidemic proportions in the United States. Volunteer and government food and refugee relief agencies have been frustrated and angered by the refusal or inability of African governments to ensure that supplies reach their destinations. This has been most evident in Sudan, where 11 million people are at risk of starvation. United States commercial banks, in the throes of their worst crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930's, angrily write off their African debts and spurn pleas for fresh loans. Multilateral and individual country donors are struggling to make up the shortfall. The IMF, the World Bank and the ADB have all substantially increased their levels of support.

AFRICA IN CRISIS

Africa's problems have grown to catastrophic proportions. Sub-Saharan Africa's foreign debt exceeds $135 billion and its debt-service ratio tripled in the 1980's. Debt-service obligations equal nearly half Africa's export earnings, and debts are almost equal to the continent's gross domestic product. Foreign exchange reserves are virtually exhausted for all but a handful of African countries. The continent also suffers from a continuing deterioration in the terms of trade with the West. The cost of oil and agroindustrial machinery has skyrocketed as the prices of minerals and tropical commodities have declined. Even in the oil-producing countries, the benefits of resurgent oil prices have been dampened by the weakness of the United States dollar, in which most exports are denominated.

Exploding population growth in sub-Saharan Africa is another problem. Population growth is nearly 4 percent per year, up from an already high 2.5 percent per year 30 years ago. Africa has 15 per-

cent of the world's population and is expected to provide 23 percent of the world's population growth in the 1990's. By conservative estimates, Africa's population will double in 22 years, far beyond the most optimistic forecasts of growth in food output.[2] Tragically, the only element that is moderating the population explosion is AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome), the fatal disease that is sweeping across the continent and has infected nearly 50 million of its 650 million people. In dozens of cities in east and central Africa, more than one-fourth of the population is infected with HIV (human immunovirus), which is believed to lead to AIDS. This epidemic has placed an intolerable strain on already overburdened African health services.

The United Nations World Food Program says that more than 20 million Africans will depend on food assistance in 1991.[3] This comes at a time when food production in most countries is not keeping pace with population. The food crisis is compounded by the massive refugee population of more than 5 million in sub-Saharan Africa. The United States remains by far the largest contributor to refugee aid, but over the years its expenditures for refugee assistance have fallen when adjusted for inflation. Other industrialized countries must increase their support because extensive food aid is needed in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Sudan.

PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES

In the United States and Europe there is a growing perception that Africa's problems are deep-seated, complex, and will take much longer and cost more to resolve than is the case elsewhere. Some contend that the solution lies in a more equitable distribution of national resources. Others say there must be a basic change in attitudes among both Africans and their economic partners, and that this will not happen without radically transformed social structures. All agree, however, that African governments are carrying burdens they can no longer afford. Collapsing commodity prices have made it impossible for many African countries to meet the West's economic performance targets. As a result, disbursement of additional aid has been delayed or suspended, compounding the problems and causing deeper frustration on the part of both donor and recipient. Moreover, seven protracted civil wars are raging in sub-Saharan Africa and three countries are suffering ethnic genocide.

While there is a growing recognition in Washington that Africans cannot solve their problems themselves, there is a lack of consensus as to how

the United States can best help and to what extent it must help financially. The Bush administration also seems to believe that problems in Africa, though enormous, do not threaten world security and peace. Many would argue that the continent can therefore be placed on the back burner until "more pressing" world problems are resolved.

Although the United States has forced radical economic reforms on Africa, it has lost its will to provide sufficient support levels for them. But if the momentum is lost and these reforms fail, Africa's next generation of leaders may become disenchanted with free market capitalist models and look elsewhere for ideas. Sooner or later, reform rhetoric will have to be matched by fresh capital and technology transfer. Otherwise the United States risks losing goodwill and credibility with a rising generation of pragmatic African leaders.

PUTTING NEW POLICIES TO THE TEST

By the late 1980's, the United States had concluded that the economic reforms it had demanded in Africa required major changes in the political environment. During the cold war, Washington felt too insecure to abandon its African allies, despite their dismal record of human and civil rights violations. But by 1990 détente with the Soviet Union was proceeding, and the United States Congress had made it clear to the President and to the State Department that future public assistance to Africa should be linked to democratization, multiparty politics, and free and fair elections.

The test of this new policy came late in 1990. The Zairean dictator, Sese Seko Mobutu, had announced political reforms in April, including a promise to end one-party control. Many human rights groups had condemned Mobutu's arbitrary arrest in early 1990 of members of the opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress. United States relations with Zaire came under greater stress in May, after Mobutu's personal guards killed dozens of student demonstrators at the University of Lubumbashi. But the State Department resisted any change in United States policy, because Mobutu allows Zaire to be used as a United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supply route for the United States-supported rebels in neighboring Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and because he serves as a key mediator in the peace negotiations between the rebels and the Angolan government.

The anti-Mobutu forces in Congress were undeterred. In November, Congress angered the State Department by voting to cut all military and economic support to Zaire and by denying the administration's request for $4 million in military aid to Zaire; it also demanded that $40 million in devel-

[2] *The Economist* (London), December 8, 1990, p. 48.
[3] Ibid., January 5, 1991, p. 33.

opment assistance should be administered by non-governmental organizations not affiliated with the Zairean government.

Herman Cohen, the United States assistant secretary of state for African affairs, has emphasized that the United States wants broad-based, freely elected multiparty governments of national reconciliation in Africa. But at what price? United States policy toward Angola, for example, has been contradictory and inconsistent. Many American-owned oil and mining firms operate in Angola, and the United States has become Angola's major trade partner. The government of President José Eduardo dos Santos has worked hard to improve every dimension of bilateral relations. But UNITA maintains a powerful lobby in Washington. Even President Bush is an admirer of Jonas Savimbi, UNITA's leader, and he has consistently pledged his support.

The CIA supplies the UNITA rebels with approximately $50 million in covert aid annually, thus contributing to continuing turmoil. Washington hopes that its military assistance to UNITA will put enough pressure on the dos Santos government to reach an accord with Savimbi on terms acceptable to the United States. Such terms include recognition of UNITA by the Angolan government, followed by multiparty elections for a new, non-Marxist regime. In late 1990, Congress said that it would suspend lethal aid to Savimbi after a cease-fire in the 15-year civil war and after progress toward free elections. But peace talks between the United States and UNITA have not yet led to a cease-fire.

Peace negotiations are also stalemated in Mozambique, where a 15-year civil war has devastated the economy and killed or displaced thousands of people. At a meeting in Washington, D.C., with President Bush, in March, 1990, President Joaquim Alberto Chissano agreed to American terms, only to have them rejected by the rebel Mozambique National Resistance (MNR).

Liberia is another test for United States policy in Africa. This west African country has been wracked by civil war since December, 1989, when Charles Taylor, a Liberian rebel, launched a guerrilla campaign. Liberia's ties with the United States date to the 1830's, when Liberia was established as a colony by former slaves and whites from the United States. Since World War II, it has been of some strategic importance to the United States. The United States has landing and refueling rights in Liberia for its military aircraft, and the Voice of America (VOA) radio transmitter in Liberia is the largest VOA

transmitter in Africa. The United States also controls a navigational facility that guides airplanes and ships, including a nuclear fleet, in the Atlantic Ocean. Liberia is also the CIA's chief listening post in west Africa.

Not surprisingly, until 1990 Liberia was the largest per capita recipient of United States aid in sub-Saharan Africa. But Liberian President Samuel Doe, who had seized power in a military coup in 1980, soon acquired a reputation for civil and human rights violations and administrative incompetence. Nonetheless, his expulsion of Libyan and Soviet citizens in the early 1980's ensured generous American aid. Doe's misdeeds became so blatant in the late 1980's, however, that Congress suspended military aid for fiscal 1990 and slashed other assistance for Liberia to less than $10 million. The Liberian economy went into a tailspin and, as the civil war unfolded, the Doe regime began to crumble.

The United States rejected Doe's call for intervention, and opted instead for a policy of strict neutrality, refusing to mediate. It continued this stance in the face of growing anarchy and ethnic and communal violence, choosing only to protect and evacuate its own citizens. Thus the United States, favoring a cease-fire, avoided any involvement with the five-nation West African military force that installed an interim government in Monrovia after the assassination of President Doe in November, 1990. The new regime's authority barely extended beyond the capital city of Monrovia, and through early 1991 various people jockeyed for power as the United States stood by in uncharacteristic silence.

Washington's human rights and democratization policies were also tested in Kenya. In the wake of President Daniel arap Moi's arrest of 11 proponents of a multiparty system, in mid-1990 the United States Congress suspended about $13 million of the $45 million it had allocated for Kenya for that fiscal year.[4] In July, United States Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone, a conservative Republican, warned Kenya that the United States would cut all military and economic aid if Moi did not release detained multiparty advocates. The Kenyan President was defiant and accused the United States of meddling in his country's internal affairs. Less than a month later Anglican Bishop Alexander Muge, a

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[4]"Kenya: A Political and Economic Forecast," Political Risk Services (IBCUSA Publications, Inc.: Syracuse, 1990), p. A7.

"When acrimonious debate over South Africa was at its height in 1986, no one predicted that within five years the [African National Congress] would call a halt to guerrilla war, the National party government would agree to repeal all apartheid legislation, and constitutional negotiations would begin. The situation five years from now may be equally unpredictable."

South Africa: Old Myths and New Realities

By Pauline H. Baker

Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

AMONG the great political transitions of this decade, the crumbling of apartheid in South Africa ranks as one of the most stunning. The country is currently moving into a hopeful albeit dangerous period. As in the Soviet Union, there have been sea changes in political thinking, but there has not been sufficient movement to be certain about a successful outcome. The possibilities of a race war and violent partition, worst-case scenarios that were predicted in the 1980's, still exist. But the chances of catastrophic confrontations have diminished, the distance between polarized groups is steadily narrowing, and compromises are being made on all sides.

In February, 1990, South African President Frederik W. de Klerk announced the release from prison of African National Congress (ANC) deputy president Nelson Mandela and the legalization of the entire spectrum of anti-apartheid opposition; six months later, the ANC, the leading liberation movement, agreed to "suspend the armed struggle." Six months after that, de Klerk announced that the government intended to repeal all apartheid laws. Although there are many problems ahead, an important political bargain has been struck: the official end of apartheid ideology and legislation in exchange for an end to guerrilla war. It took roughly a year of hard bargaining after Mandela's release to get to this point, but it represents a watershed. While deep differences remain, the government has shifted from unilateral reforms to engaging in consultative decision making, and the ANC has switched from violent opposition to negotiation.

A complex political culture is emerging in which warring organizations are coming together to build a new political center. Various coalitions based on class, ideology, ethnicity, personality, special interests and locality are forming. Because South Africa lacks a democratic tradition, the transition is proving painful and bloody. Rivalries are multiply-

ing, holdouts on both the left and the right are digging in, and solidarities forged during the apartheid era are dissolving.

To understand what has happened in the past 18 months and to grasp evolving developments, the predominant myths that have shaped the world's and South Africans' perceptions of South Africa need to be identified and examined against the new realities that are turning the country's politics upside down. The popular perceptions of South Africa fall into three main categories: myths about whites, myths about blacks and myths about the nature of political change.

MYTHS ABOUT WHITES

Whites do not respond to pressure. Under siege, they retreat into the laager. Of all the myths about white South Africans, none has been so widespread as the assumption of white intransigence, regardless of cost. This has often been described through the metaphor of the "laager," the circle of ox-drawn covered wagons used by eighteenth-century Afrikaner settlers during conflicts with Africans (a survival tactic similar to that used by white settlers in the western United States). Politically, the term has come to refer to a unique political mentality; it was thought that the ruling white regime, under pressure, would only harden its position further.

Fortified in the twentieth century by security forces that were second to none in Africa, the white oligarchy that ruled South Africa was regarded as impregnable by most foreign powers. This premise, sometimes called the citadel hypothesis, was so deeply ingrained that it became the basis for United States policy toward South Africa during the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. The premise was set forth in the 1970 National Security Study Memorandum Number 39.[1] The paper stated that "the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them." It advocated

public opposition to racial oppression, but relaxed political isolation and economic restrictions on the

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[1] Thomas G. Karis, "South Africa and the United States: Constructive Engagement," in David Mermelstein, ed., *The Anti-Apartheid Reader* (New York: Grove Press, 1987), p. 338.

South Africa's Apartheid Legislation

Apartheid in South Africa is based on a series of acts passed by the white-controlled government. The following are summaries of the most important acts institutionalizing apartheid and the security measures enforcing it.

Native Land Act (1913) Defined certain areas as African Reserves (areas that later constituted the "independent black homelands"), denied blacks the right to purchase land in white areas, and outlawed the system that allowed blacks to live in white-owned areas as sharecroppers or rent-paying tenants; the act also prohibited whites from acquiring land in the African Reserves.*

Native Trust and Land Act (1936) Reinforced and extended the 1913 law; it also expanded the so-called African Reserves, increasing the portion of South Africa's land reserved for blacks from 7 to 13 percent.*

Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) Made marriage between whites and Africans illegal. The first Immorality Act, passed in 1685, forbade sexual relations between whites and blacks but permitted them between whites and Coloureds (mixed-race people). **Repealed in 1985.**

Group Areas Act (1950) Designated land, mostly in urban areas, for ownership and occupation according to race; white suburbs were established near the central and business districts of the cities while black townships were established on the outskirts.*

Mixed Marriages and Immorality Act (1950) Extended the ban on interracial marriage by prohibiting sexual relations between whites and people of other racial groups, including Coloureds. **Repealed in 1985.**

Population Registration Act (1950) Required the systematic classification of people into one of three racial categories: white, African or Coloured; these later evolved into four main categories (white, African, Asian and Coloured), with Coloureds and Africans subdivided by ethnicity.*

Suppression of Communism Act (1950) Made the Communist party and groups that had aims similar to communism illegal and banned (that is, placed under virtual house arrest) people who "furthered the aims of communism"; communism was defined as any doctrine that attempted to bring about political, industrial, social or economic change in South Africa by promoting disorder or by encouraging hostility between whites and nonwhites. **The ban on the Communist party and restrictions on 33 anti-apartheid organizations were lifted in 1990, but the law has not yet been repealed.**

Bantu Authorities Act (1951) Nominally granted greater autonomy to the African Reserves by providing for the establishment of tribal, regional and territorial authorities with limited powers of self-government; all authorities were to be appointed by the South African government.

Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) Required separate amenities (that is, public facilities like parks, recreation areas, transportation, government services) for different races and decreed that the standards for these amenities need not be equal. **Repealed in 1990.**

Bantu Education Act (1953) Segregated education, making black education subject to the Native Affairs Department rather than the Education Department, and increased government control over curriculum and resources to prevent blacks from receiving education for jobs traditionally reserved for whites.

Public Safety Act (1953) Gave commissioned police officers and magistrates the power summarily to arrest without trial or judicial review anyone suspected of committing or intending to commit an offense, or of having information relating to an offense; it allowed a state of emergency to be declared for up to one year.

Terrorism Act (1967) Permitted the police to detain indefinitely suspected terrorists or those presumed to have information about terrorism.

Internal Security Act (1976) Revamped the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 by permitting the preventive detention of anyone the government considered a danger to state security or the maintenance of public order. It was revised in 1982 so that it effectively terminated lawful opposition by black organizations, curtailed freedom of speech and expanded police authority to hold detainees incommunicado for extended periods without judicial intervention.

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*In February, 1991, South African President F.W. de Klerk asked Parliament to repeal these acts.

Sources: Roger Omond, *The Apartheid Handbook: A Guide to South Africa's Everyday Racial Politics* (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1985), J. Gus Liebenow, *African Politics: Crises and Challenges* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), and Pauline Baker, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

white states [which then included Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia] . . . [and] broadening the scope of our relations and contacts gradually. . . .[2]

The assumption of white impregnability proved false, not only in the former British and Portuguese colonies, but in South Africa as well. Accumulated internal and external pressures forced the South African government to recalculate basic policies and principles that had been in force for 40 years. These pressures included a resilient black resistance, a weakened economy, overextended military involvement in the region, market demands and, strikingly, international economic sanctions. Combined with the diminished threat of communism at the end of the cold war, these factors exposed the myth of the laager.[3] Pressure provoked a retreat from apartheid, which was precisely the intended effect.

The extreme right wing ensures that no white regime, however reformist, will go too far or too fast. Closely associated with the myth of the laager was the idea that the far right—reactionary elements in the security forces, commercial farmers and blue-collar workers who represented the traditional support base of the National party—would ensure that no white government would negotiate with the ANC, agree to give blacks the right to vote, or move away from guarantees of "group rights," a euphemism for white privilege. Indeed, for decades conventional wisdom held that power sharing with blacks could not be realized until well into the twenty-first century.

The right-wing constituency continues to haunt the process, as seen in foot-dragging by the government on the implementation of joint agreements, continuing apartheid rhetoric and thinking, and failure to get to the heart of controversial issues like the so-called "third force" alleged to be promoting violence. Nevertheless, President de Klerk has moved further and faster than any previous South African head of state, surprising many including the ANC. For example, in 1990 he legalized the South African Communist party (SACP) as well as nearly three dozen other anti-apartheid organiza-

tions rather than lifting the ban selectively; in 1991 he announced to Parliament his intention to seek the repeal of all apartheid legislation, not just the Group Areas Act and the Land Acts, which he led most observers to believe was his limit. And de Klerk has been flexible when it has been politically advantageous, reversing himself on the pace of privatization, a central National party policy platform, and accepting the need for a multiparty conference, an idea he had previously rejected. De Klerk, who comes from the conservative wing of the National party and has an impeccable Afrikaner pedigree, has shattered the stereotype of the reactionary Afrikaner.

The extent to which his actions challenge traditional white attitudes has been demonstrated by his decision to rescind the Population Registration Act, the law that laid the foundation for nearly all other racial statutes and programs of the last 40 years. Notwithstanding the provision that the repeal of this act would be accompanied by the adoption of temporary transitional measures—ostensibly in order to hold by-elections for the existing tricameral Parliament, but more likely in order to hold a white referendum on the final settlement—this decision has far-reaching constitutional implications that cut to the core of white rule.

The Population Registration Act requires the classification by race of every person at birth. If the act is rescinded, there can be no explicit race-based provisions in a new constitution, no immutable entrenchment of "group rights" defined by race and no whites-only general elections in the future. De Klerk is not bargaining for a breathing space for whites, after which anything can happen; he is seeking durable, universal protections that will ensure whites a full role in the country rather than the status of a merely tolerated minority. Moreover, since there cannot be another whites-only general election, he has committed the government to a settlement deadline of 1994, when the term of the existing government expires. De Klerk could not have made such commitments that fly in the face of core apartheid orthodoxy unless he were confident that the threat from the right was contained.

The South African government is so discredited by apartheid that the international community will await the achievement of majority rule before lifting international sanctions, boycotts and policies isolating South Africa. Few countries have suffered the international ostracism South Africa has endured because of domestic policies and few have paid as high a price financially. The United States, which set the pace on this issue during the 1980's, brought home the point after a bitter national debate that resulted in congressional enactment in 1986 of economic sanctions, the

[2]This quotation refers to Option Two in a policy paper that laid out several options. Option Two was ultimately adopted, although this was kept secret at the time. While the administration of President Jimmy Carter did not explicitly accept the assumption, it also shunned putting pressure on South Africa, recognizing that there was then little public support for a more aggressive posture. President Ronald Reagan's administration, however, picked up on this tack. During the debate over sanctions, the assumption was finally rejected by the Congress.

[3]Details on the factors leading up to the breakthrough are discussed in Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa on the Move," *Current History,* May, 1990.

toughest measures taken against South Africa by any major Western country. This was the first time that Pretoria had received an unmistakable message from a major foreign power that South Africa, as a matter of law, would have to pay for withholding the political rights of its black citizens.[4] From that point forward, it became apparent that, whatever evasive actions Pretoria took, the international noose would inexorably tighten and could not be untied without a fundamental political breakthrough.

De Klerk's reforms have been such a breakthrough. The European Community agreed in December, 1990, to lift its voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa as soon as the Group Areas Act and the Land Acts are repealed. De Klerk received red-carpet treatment on visits to six sub-Saharan African countries: Mozambique, Zaire, Zambia, Madagascar, Senegal and Ivory Coast. By February, 1991, Pretoria had established 13 new trade missions, 7 in East Europe and 6 in Africa. Denmark and Sweden, among the most ardent supporters of sanctions, gave the green light to corporations in their countries to invest in South Africa. And the Soviet Union agreed to open low-level diplomatic relations with South Africa and concluded a $5-billion diamond deal with De Beers, the South African corporate giant, despite Moscow's rhetorical adherence to sanctions and its support of the ANC.

"President F.W. de Klerk's initiatives," reported London's *Financial Times*, "have brought [South African exporters] . . . to the threshold of normalized trade relations."[5] Barriers in sports, cultural affairs and business are also coming down. Andrew Young, the former United States ambassador to the United Nations (UN) who is chairman of the Atlanta Olympic Organizing Committee, said that he believed "South Africa could be in good enough shape to be in Atlanta in 1996" for the Olympic summer games.[6]

These openings occurred despite strenuous ANC efforts to persuade the international community to retain economic sanctions until further political progress was made. By moving ahead, foreign government are distancing themselves from the ANC, signaling greater acceptance of the white government and showing extraordinary confidence in negotiations years before majority rule has been achieved.

MYTHS ABOUT BLACKS

Because of its sweeping popular support and its links to the South African Communist party, the ANC will strive to make South Africa a one-party Marxist state. The South African government's demonization of the ANC distorted and oversimplified the image of the organization; for decades the ANC was portrayed as a monolithic liberation movement driven by radical elements and dedicated to authoritarian domination. More than anything else, fear of a one-party Marxist state under black rule hardened white resistance to power sharing and negotiations. This legacy lives on in the white right wing, which continues to accuse the ANC of being an authoritarian organization controlled by Moscow.

The ANC remains South Africa's leading anti-apartheid organization, but it certainly is not the only one. Many analysts doubt that the ANC will win an overwhelming majority in an election, much less eliminate all opposition; in any event, both the ANC and the Communist party have conceded the principle of a multiparty system. The belief that the ANC could impose monolithic control, even if that were its objective, seems fanciful in light of its diverse composition and internecine rivalries. This was illustrated by sharp differences within the ANC over kidnapping and assault charges brought against Nelson Mandela's wife, Winnie, during her trial in 1991.* And in a revealing interview while in the United States, Nelson Mandela explained that the ANC was

formed as a parliament of the African people. Right from the start, up to now the ANC is a coalition, if you want, of people of various political affiliations. Some will support free enterprise, others socialism. We are united solely by our determination to oppose racial oppression. That is the only thing that unites us. . . . [A]ny question approaching ideology would split the organization from top to bottom.[7]

The Communist party, which began working with the ANC in the 1940's, still clings to a socialist

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*Editor's note: In early February, 1991, Winnie Mandela and seven men who worked as her bodyguards were brought before a Johannesburg court on kidnapping and assault charges. The charges stemmed from a December, 1988, incident in which four Soweto youths suspected of being police informants were allegedly beaten by the bodyguards and Mandela; one of the youths died.

[4] The contents of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 are summarized in Pauline H. Baker, *United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years* (New York: Ford Foundation-Foreign Policy Association, 1989), appendix D.

[5] *Financial Times*, February 28, 1991, p. 9.

[6] *Washington Post*, October 11, 1990, p. E1.

[7] Ibid., June 27, 1990, p. A15.

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> *"Nigeria's third quest for democracy will have the advantages of an increasingly resourceful and independent civil society, a strong cultural commitment to liberty and widespread disillusionment with the military as an answer to the country's problems."*

Nigeria's Third Quest for Democracy

By Larry Diamond

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NIGERIA is moving back to civilian rule. Despite persistent ethnic conflict, increased religious tension, continuing economic stagnation and nagging doubt that the military really intends to relinquish power, the transition to democracy is proceeding inexorably toward its scheduled conclusion in October, 1992. Barring an unforeseen disaster, Nigeria will then try for the third time in its three decades of independence to operate a democratic system successfully.

The five years of transition to the Third Republic under military President Ibrahim Babangida have been marked by daring policy experimentation and intense political controversy, as the regime has implemented simultaneously one of the most far-reaching programs to restructure an economy in Africa and one of the most elaborate transitions to democracy in history. The interaction between these two transitions in the context of endemic political corruption has had much to do with the contradictory nature of the transition process: at once democratic and repressive; popular and elitist; novel and familiar; promising and depressing.

General Babangida cultivated an image as a liberal democratic reformer in his first years in office. The public had welcomed his overthrow in 1985 of the military dictatorship headed by Generals Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon, and the many liberal steps he took in its wake. Among these actions were the release of detained journalists and critics, the review of the detentions of hundreds of former politicians and the withdrawal of the noxious Decree Number 4, which had shackled the press. They also included Babangida's rejection of a $2.5-billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan after overwhelming public opposition was expressed and the appointment of distinguished members to a political bureau (or Politburo) that would tour the country and elicit suggestions on the shape of what he called the "new political order."

But Babangida and his military government's relationship with the press began to sour when crusading *Newswatch* editor Dele Giwa was assassinated by a parcel bomb in October, 1986 — a case that remains unsolved. The implementation of harsh economic measures in 1986 and 1987 brought the regime into frequent confrontation with articulate urban groups, especially those representing students, intellectuals and labor. During 1988, the military government took over the affairs of the sole trade union confederation, the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), closed 32 institutions of higher learning after riots protesting the partial removal of the petroleum subsidy, and then banned all strikes and demonstrations, along with the NLC and the National Association of Nigerian Students.[1]

Repression and confrontation have been an important part of the political transition, but not the only part. For more than five years they have alternated and coexisted with political reform and innovation. The transition timetable, drawn up largely in response to a report from the Politburo, began in the third quarter of 1987 with the establishment of a National Electoral Commission and the appointment of a 46-member Constitution Review Committee to draft a revision of the 1979 constitution (on the basis of the Politburo "blueprint," as revised in a government white paper).

In 1987, local government elections were held on a nonpartisan basis; though marred by administrative foul-ups, political controversies and sporadic rioting, the elections produced the first popularly elected officials of the transition.[2] In February, 1988, a constituent assembly was established through appointment and indirect election "to deliberate upon" the proposed draft of the constitution and to recommend a constitution to the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), which it did in April, 1989.

The constitution that emerged from this three-

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[1] For more on Nigeria from the fall of the Second Republic in the December, 1983, coup to 1989, see Larry Diamond, "Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism and the Struggle for Democracy," in Larry Diamond et al., *Democracy in Developing Countries, Vol. 2: Africa* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1988), pp. 55-60, 75-85; and Jon Kraus, "Economic Adjustment and Regime Creation in Nigeria," *Current History,* May, 1989.

[2] P. Chudi Uwazurike, "Confronting Potential Breakdown: The Nigerian Redemocratisation Process in Critical Perspective," *Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 28, no. 1 (1990), p. 64.

year process is in many respects similar to the 1979 constitution. It retains the presidentialism and multistate federalism of the Second Republic (1979–1983), along with the requirement that political parties and presidential appointments "reflect the federal character" of Nigeria by drawing from states and ethnic groups across the country. Proposals to create many more states (thereby only strengthening the center) were wisely rejected; only 2 have been added, making a total of 21 states. The military also rejected proposals from the Politburo and constituent assembly to write into the constitution a socialist or welfare ideology and a ban on future coups. Indeed, in inaugurating the constituent assembly, President Babangida ruled a number of elements nonnegotiable, including federalism, presidentialism, the two-party system, basic freedoms, state neutrality on religion and the sweeping ban he had imposed on the participation of virtually all former politicians and high public officials in party politics during the transition.

Nevertheless, the "new political order" contains some important innovations, and in this sense it follows a long historical tradition of revising the constitution to remedy the country's political problems. Probably the most striking innovation is the mandatory two-party system recommended by the Politburo. This was a compromise between the cynicism and disgust with the corrupt, abusive political parties of the past and the grudging recognition that only a two-party system could allow for the meaningful competition of interests in a modern democracy. Also important is the enhanced power of local government, which increased its share of federal revenue from 10 to 15 percent, with enlarged responsibility for services and other provisions that may make local governments autonomous for the first time.

The effort to reverse the flow of power and turn it back to the grass roots coincides with a comprehensive effort to create a new Nigerian political culture. In September, 1987, the Directorate for Social Mobilization was inaugurated, under the acronym MAMSER (Mass Mobilization for Self-Reliance, Economic Recovery and Social Justice). In the past three years, it has sponsored rallies, lectures, radio advertisements, drama troupes, school programs, curriculum development and other media presentations in an attempt to educate Nigerians about the mechanics and requirements of democracy in the Third Republic. This has included appeals to Nigerians to reject ethnic and religious bigotry, exercise their democratic rights, and "identify, ex-

pose, and reject corruption in all facets of Nigeria's national life." During 1990 a new Center for Democratic Studies trained thousands of newly elected party and local government officials in democratic principles and practice.

ECONOMIC PAIN

MAMSER's appeals for a new democratic ethic in Nigeria rang increasingly hollow for a great many Nigerians when juxtaposed with the suffering caused by structural adjustment and the corruption that prevailed at every level of the regime. The transition to democracy has unfolded in the midst of the most profound and prolonged economic depression in Nigeria's three decades of independence. This depression began with the plunge in oil income during the final two years (1982–1983) of the Second Republic. It produced four successive years of negative growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) and an especially sharp decline in manufacturing before Babangida formally announced his Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in June, 1986. Nevertheless, as the naira (N), the national currency, was cut loose to find its value first in a two-tiered and then in a unified foreign exchange market, it plummeted to a level that devastated urban workers in particular. From well over parity with the United States dollar during the Second Republic, the naira's value fell from four or five naira to the dollar in 1987 to more than seven naira to the dollar in mid-1989. In early 1991 the naira traded at around ten to the dollar, continuing a slow descent that gnaws at the living standards of the middle class.

A top professor's salary of N27,000, worth roughly $30,000 when Babangida assumed power in 1985, plunged to less than $4,000 in value by 1989; and a full professor or higher level civil servant did not earn more than three-fourths that amount. Under structural adjustment, salaried workers in the public sector (whose income has remained frozen while fringe benefits have been reduced) have lost virtually all hope of being able to purchase a car, or to travel or educate their children abroad. Even the most basic elements of a middle class life have become painful to maintain, with market reforms increasing electricity costs by some 300 percent and telephone costs by roughly 900 percent.[3] In response, thousands of salaried professionals — doctors, nurses, pilots, engineers, professors — have fled abroad for better paying jobs.

Frustration for the middle class became real suffering among the urban lower classes, who were affected not only by the drastic devaluation but perhaps even more by other elements of SAP like the decontrol of agricultural producer prices, the retrenchment in the public sector workforce and in

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[3]Tade Akin Aina, "The Social Consequences of SAP" (Paper presented to the Conference on Democratic Transition and Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Cal., August 27–29, 1990), p. 23.

private industry, and the reduction of subsidies in petroleum, transportation and other consumer goods and services. Commuters in the sprawling megalopolis of Lagos were walking as much as 12 miles a day to and from work because of rampant breakdowns and price inflation in public and private transport. After the heady gains of the oil-boom era, urban wages plunged to the equivalent of a few hundred dollars a year. Workers were hard-pressed to feed and clothe their families, just as public schools and hospitals began to charge for their services again. Food prices increased an estimated 50 percent in 1988 and signs of malnutrition reemerged.[4]

In much of the country, education became a holding operation; schools did not have books or desks or even basic supplies like chalk and paper, not to mention scientific equipment. As facilities deteriorated and enrollment continued to increase—driven by an annual population growth rate estimated at 3.5 percent that will double the demand for goods and services in 20 years—university students found themselves living in appallingly crowded and poorly maintained hostels.

SAP had some positive effects: some crop yields increased, cocoa production temporarily boomed, and the country's balance of payments improved. However, industrial production continued at less than half capacity, and agriculture in general failed to take off as anticipated.[5] With the urban poor forced into a struggle for survival and with politically assertive students, intellectuals and professionals increasingly bitter, violent urban or student protest was to be expected.

Yet no one was prepared for the outpouring of fury against SAP that began in Benin City on May 25, 1989, and quickly spread throughout the country, claiming more than 50 lives and causing millions in property damage. Protesting SAP and

related grievances, university students took to the streets. They were seen joined by schoolchildren, workers, frustrated job seekers, hawkers and thugs. Chanting "SAP must go!" and "Babangida must go!" they attacked and sometimes torched not only government property but also anyone who did not express solidarity—and, at times, anything combustible.

What most angered critics of SAP was the inequitable distribution of the burdens of the economic adjustment. "In a country where it is gradually becoming difficult for people to eat, million-naira houses are springing up everyday," they said, and "wealth is openly flaunted."[6] Significantly, the immediate catalyst for the riots appears to have been two handbills purportedly documenting corruption and fantastic wealth hidden overseas on the part of President Babangida and his deputy in the military government, chief of general staff (now Vice President) Admiral Augustus Aikhomu. Although at least one of the handbills was factually incorrect (falsely alleging that United States-based *Ebony* magazine had published an exposé on the President), the rumors rang true for a public that had seen mounting evidence of corruption and high living on the part of high-ranking military officers. A Lagos minister expressed a popular sentiment when, in a church service launching the week-long independence anniversary celebrations in 1988, he declared before an audience of top government officials:

> The only people who have a present and a future are the children of the military men, the politicians and all who are [on] the bandwagon of the corrupt aristocratic society. Nothing has changed. Nothing. There is so much fraud, corruption and looting of the national treasury.

By March, 1990, resentment of official corruption was building to a crescendo. Leading news-weeklies ran cover stories on corruption, detailing incidents of misappropriation of funds, abuse of contract awards, payment of huge "mobilization fees" on contracts in advance of any work, and a wide array of financial irregularities uncovered by the federal auditor-general.[7] Serious scandals enveloped the military governments of four states, including Cross River, where a "state redemption movement" had been formed to document and protest official malfeasance. The President was occasionally forced by public outcry to retire military governors, and in March, 1990, he created an internal panel to monitor their performance. But the frequent shuffling of Babangida's governors and ministers became a source of cynicism, as "it was not a hidden fact" that military officers had lobbied shamelessly for these lucrative positions.[8]

[4]One sample of two-year-old children in Lagos and surrounding rural areas in 1988–1989 found that half were stunted by malnutrition and two percent were "wasted." Conditions in many areas of the country may be worse. An informal survey in 1988 indicated that hospitals reported a 200 percent increase in the number of children suffering from kwashiorkor. See *West Africa* (London), October 17-23, 1988, p. 1966.

[5]Thomas J. Biersteker, "The Relationship Between Economic and Political Reforms: Structural Adjustment and the Political Transition in Nigeria" (Paper presented to the Conference on Democratic Transition, Hoover Institution, August 27-29, 1990), pp. 62-63.

[6]*Newswatch* (Lagos), July 24, 1989, p. 18.

[7]Ibid., March 19, 1990, pp. 10-15; *African Concord* (Lagos), March 26, 1990, pp. 28-34; *This Week* (Lagos), April 2, 1990, pp. 8-15.

[8]J. Isawa Elaigwu, "Prospects for a Democratic Polity in Nigeria: The Ballot Box and the Barracks" (Paper presented to the Conference on Democratic Transition and Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, January 9-12, 1991), p. 19.

THE DESCENT INTO POLITICAL CRISIS

General Babangida's political base narrowed as disaffection with SAP and widespread corruption grew through 1988 and 1989. Unfortunately, the regime's response to growing criticism was not to launch another national dialogue but rather to repress debate and punish dissenters. In June, 1989, Gani Fawehinmi, a lawyer who had tried to bring charges against state security officials for the murder of *Newswatch* editor Giwa, was arrested along with veteran social critics Michael Imoudu and Tai Solarin. The three were arrested after they refused to heed the warnings of the State Security Service (SSS) not to hold a planned conference on "The Alternative to SAP." Although Imoudu and Solarin were quickly released, Fawehinmi was removed to a remote SSS detention center, where he spent several weeks under extremely harsh conditions.

Journalists have also frequently been victims of Decree Number 2, which authorizes the military government to detain without trial people who threaten "state security." Detainees under the decree have included journalists reporting on corruption stories, student and union leaders prominent in anti-SAP protests, and a businessman who claimed to have paid $500,000 into the Swiss bank account of Vice President Aikhomu for his assistance in a business deal. In a March, 1990, special report, Nigeria's Civil Liberties Organisation estimated that several thousand Nigerians had been detained under the decree during Babangida's five years in office.

With the increasing incidence of repression also came a chilling expansion in the size, role and autonomy of the state security network. Dissidents were "abducted" and detained, and university campuses and dissident organizations were believed to be widely infiltrated by SSS agents. By the spring of 1990, there was a climate of fear and apprehension in the country. The public was also anxious about the purpose of a new National Guard that was to be organized to back up the police in riot control.

A key element in the public's anxiety was the Guard's direct responsibility to the President. Through 1989 and the early months of 1990, concern mounted over the unprecedented accumulation and centralization of presidential power. Having emerged as the most articulate, dynamic and resourceful politician ever to head a Nigerian government, Babangida was beginning to appear to many Nigerians as the country's first real dictator. Doubts emerged that he intended to return the presidency to civilians after October, 1992.

On October 7, 1989, President Babangida

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[9]Uwazurike, op. cit., p. 66.

stunned the nation by announcing a decision of the AFRC not to register any of the 13 associations that had applied for recognition as one of Nigeria's two political parties. Instead, he declared, the government would create two new parties — the Social Democratic party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC), one "a little to the left" and the other "a little to the right." The decision also significantly pushed back the transition timetable, postponing partisan local government elections one year, to late 1990, and state elections to late 1991. Suspicions that the President intended to exercise control over both parties were not put to rest by his detailed and impassioned "presentation of evidence and arguments to prove the continuing influence of ethnicity, regionalism, money and false claims in the party-registration exercise."[9]

The following month, appeals began to appear regularly in newspaper advertisements, letters and editorials urging Babangida to rethink the 1992 transition date; the appeals asked him to stay in office to ensure the success of his economic and political reforms — even until the year 2000, if necessary. The creation of the National Guard, Babangida's assumption of personal leadership of the Ministry of Defense and a loophole in Decree Number 25 that would "not prevent" him from "continuing in that office until such time as he is replaced" were all viewed as ominous warning signs by those who had not made the appeals.

As the two new parties were getting off the ground, with government-drafted manifestos and government-appointed temporary administrators, simmering conflicts within the AFRC burst into the open. At the end of 1989, Babangida's second government reshuffle within the year went sour. In a sweeping December 29 reorganization engineered by the President himself, the AFRC was once again dissolved. The previous dissolution 10 months earlier (challenged unsuccessfully in court) had been the first time in 17 years of military administration in Nigeria that the supreme legislative organ of the military had been dismissed. Three of the four service chiefs were also replaced — another

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"Neither a liberal democracy nor a repressive dictatorship, Kenya is a society under constant negotiation and revision."

The Politics of Dissent in Kenya

By Patricia Stamp
Associate Professor of Social Science, York University

WHEN observers seek a prognosis on the future of African politics, they take Kenya's pulse. Soon after gaining its independence in 1963, Kenya was pronounced one of Africa's healthiest nations, both economically and politically. Optimistic diagnoses saw the country as a herald of an African brand of parliamentary democracy, as the pioneer of African agrarian capitalism, or as sub-Saharan Africa's first East Asian-style economic miracle in the making. More pessimistic assessments, particularly during the 1980's, saw an ailing body politic and an economy that was finally losing its immunity to maladies suffered elsewhere in Africa.[1]

The start of the 1990's found Kenya on the examining table once again. On the positive side, there was a surge of popular pressure for democratic reform, which was met by some responsive gestures from President Daniel arap Moi and the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the ruling party. On the negative side, the regime resorted to its old tactics of detaining dissidents without trial and violently suppressing public demonstrations; moreover, two popular leaders, a bishop and a Cabinet minister, met unexplained, violent deaths. These events were set against a backdrop of turmoil the Persian Gulf crisis created for Kenya's oil-dependent economy.

Rather than asking when and how the "Kenyan miracle" will fail, political analysts should consider why the society has not faltered. Kenya's resilience lies not only in the vigor of its political institutions, but in its capacity to stage debates about the country's cultural attitudes and beliefs. The events of 1990, and episodes in Kenya's recent past, reveal the complex relationship between repression and democracy in Kenya under Moi.

"A TUMULTUOUS YEAR"

In the words of the Kenyan news journal, the *Weekly Review,* 1990 was "a tumultuous year" during which "fast-moving events kept the political temperature at fever pitch."[2] All the recurrent themes of Kenyan political crisis and response were played out in rapid succession.[3] The issue of a multiparty system, muted since the de jure establishment of a one-party state in 1982, received renewed popular attention with the fall of one-party states in East Europe. The protest against single-party rule began in a Nairobi Presbyterian pulpit on New Year's Day and progressed to a national debate, led first by outspoken priests and then by former Cabinet ministers Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia, two of Kenya's most experienced politicians. The protest reached a climax in July with the arrest of Matiba, Rubia and other multiparty advocates, and the bloody suppression of riots in Nairobi, Nakuru and several Central Province towns.

The political debate contained the familiar complaint that freedom of speech was being denied and the popular will was being manipulated. KANU came under direct fire for its repressive tactics, undemocratic procedures and lack of public accountability.[4] Implicit in this criticism was a challenge to President Moi himself, the architect of KANU in its present form.

A new chapter in Kenya's saga of political assassination added to the tension. Robert Ouko, the internationally known foreign minister, was killed in mysterious circumstances in mid-February. He apparently left his country home during the night of February 12, and on February 16, his burnt corpse was found in the bush three kilometers away. After an attempted cover-up (the government suggested that Ouko had committed suicide), there was speculation that the government had conspired to assassinate Ouko in order to remove a political competitor.

The murder was an eerie replay of the July,

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[1] See Michael Lofchie, "Kenya: Still an Economic Miracle?" *Current History,* May, 1990; and Michael Maren, "Kenya: The Dissolution of Democracy," *Current History,* May, 1987.

[2] *Weekly Review* (Nairobi), December 21, 1990, p. 4. Many of the quotations in this article are drawn from various issues of this journal.

[3] For earlier analyses of these themes, see Patricia Stamp, "Kenya: The Echoing Footsteps," *Current History,* March, 1982; and Stamp, "Kenya's Year of Discontent," *Current History,* March, 1983.

[4] A Kenyan commentator asserted that KANU had become a "Stalinist" party and had deliberately emulated Soviet party practices. Personal communication with an anonymous source, Nairobi, July, 1989.

1969, assassination of Finance Minister Tom Mboya, Kenya's second most powerful politician after President Jomo Kenyatta. Like Ouko, Mboya was a "favorite son" of the Luo, a major ethnic group whose aspirations to national leadership have been frustrated under both the Kenyatta and Moi regimes. It is widely believed that the Kenyatta regime was implicated in both Mboya's death and the assassination of a populist Member of Parliament (MP), J.M. Kariuki, in March, 1975. (Mboya was seen as a threat to the dominance of Kenyatta's Kikuyu ethnic group; Kariuki, himself a Kikuyu, challenged the power of Kenyatta's family.)

As in 1969 and 1975, the assassination of a popular leader in 1990 led to widespread anger. Moi, a member of the Kalenjin, a smaller and less cohesive ethnic group that has neither the education nor the material resources of the Kikuyu or the Luo, has had a more difficult task in maintaining legitimacy than did Kenyatta. Kenyatta simply had to keep the Luo at bay. But Moi has had to pursue alliances with other, smaller groups, playing the country's two chief ethnic groups off against each other. Containing the formerly dominant Kikuyu without arousing them to revolt, he has maintained the Luo as quiescent allies, supportive of his regime but not powerful enough to defy it.

Luo outrage at Ouko's assassination threatened the ethnic power balance Moi had achieved. Moi needed to avoid a resurgence of Luo militancy or, worse, an opposition alliance between the Kikuyu and Luo (close collaboration between Kikuyu and Luo church leaders in the multiparty debate suggests that such an alliance is not an impossibility). To allay public misgivings about government complicity in Ouko's death and to placate the Luo, the government requested investigative assistance from Britain's New Scotland Yard. Suspicion was further fueled, however, when the government kept the report from Scotland Yard's three-month investigation under wraps. Instead, late in the year the government set up a judicial commission of inquiry into Ouko's death; the inquiry was expected to continue long into 1991.

In the midst of the Ouko affair, a controversial church leader, Anglican bishop Alexander Muge,

died in a mysterious car accident. The events before and after his death on August 14 were pure melodrama. Muge, a member of the Luhyia ethnic group of western Kenya, became well known in early August when he claimed that a clique of powerful and corrupt ministers had isolated President Moi from public opinion and was feeding him false information. Just before the crash, Peter Okondo, the minister for labor, warned the bishop that if he set foot in his home district of Busia to spread such accusations, he "will see fire and may not leave alive." The crash occurred as Muge left the Luhyia district after an open-air sermon in which he proclaimed, "Let Okondo know that my innocent blood will haunt him forever."

A hasty High Court trial proceeded over the protests of Muge's widow, who demanded that the promised public inquest into her husband's death be held first. The truck driver who killed Muge was convicted of dangerous driving and jailed. Whether the crash was in fact murder or an accident is beside the point; the belief that Okondo's threat had been carried out took firm root. Okondo was forced to resign for having a "loose tongue," but the political damage caused by his threat had been done: yet another ethnic group, the Luhyia, had cause for suspicion and animosity toward the government.

The government repeated the refrain that dissidents were undermining Kenyan stability and security. The surreptitious return of a well-known exile, Koigi Wamwere, his dramatic capture in Nairobi with a cache of arms in October, and the subsequent charges of treason against him and his accomplices lent credence to the regime's claim. Sudden demolition strikes against Nairobi slum dwellers in May and October, apparently ordered by the minister for local government, were linked to the activities of Wamwere and his accomplices. While callousness toward the urban poor by the Kenyan elite has been a constant theme since independence, this particularly harsh action must be seen in the light of the government's claim that Wamwere and his brother had been inciting city hawkers — the chief targets of the demolition squads — to disobey the government and "promote the violence culture."

In an attempt to contain the storm of public discontent accompanying these events, KANU formed a ten-man committee led by Vice President George Saitoti to review the most contentious issues, like unwarranted party expulsions and the queue voting system.[5] Because of criticism that the committee was composed entirely of party hardliners opposed to reform, the President appointed nine more members and widened the review mandate. Touring the country between July and August, the committee offered citizens as unprece-

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[5]In 1986 the party had introduced a system of "queue voting" as a method of nominating candidates for civic and parliamentary elections. Only KANU party members could vote — they would do so by physically lining up behind their candidate at nomination meetings; any candidate who thus obtained at least 70 percent of the "queue vote" was declared the constituency's elected representative. In the 1988 general election, the system disenfranchised many Kenyans, putting politicians in office with a small minority of party-approved voters. There were also charges of voter coercion and election rigging.

dented opportunity to voice their concerns on Kenyan politics, economy and society (it was this committee that listened to Bishop Muge's charges of corruption in high places). The President received the committee's report in November and called a special KANU delegates conference in early December to discuss the report's findings and its recommendations for democratic reform.

When a majority of the 3,600 delegates to the conference opposed the Saitoti committee recommendation to reinstate the secret ballot in party nominations, President Moi preempted their deliberations with his own recommendations, matching the committee's reform agenda and scrapping the queue voting system. Moi also announced the drafting of a constitutional amendment to restore job security to the attorney general, to the judiciary and to senior civil servants — safeguards he himself had undermined several years before.

HOW DOES KENYA SURVIVE?

By the end of 1990, it appeared that once again Kenya had survived political disaster. What accounts for Kenya's political staying power? One reason is economic stability. This stability comes from a dominant agrarian elite that is in partnership with a competent — if internally fractious — business elite; both are supported by a well-educated bureaucratic elite that runs the nation's affairs efficiently and has the salaried comfort to keep the economy stimulated.[6] All have too much to lose from withdrawing support from the government, regardless of how distasteful its policies are; the political disorder and economic decay suffered in neighboring countries like Uganda and Somalia are ever-present reminders of what might happen to Kenya should the government lose its legitimacy among the upper and middle classes.

A patriotic nationalism is thus widespread in these classes, and few challenge the legitimacy of the Kenyan state itself. Opposition to Moi's regime,

however, is another matter. The middle class has been inventive and persistent in its opposition. Herein lies the chief clue to Kenya's political durability: the robust and resilient politics of dissent that have characterized Kenyan society since independence. In an apparent paradox, the Kenyan state retains its legitimacy precisely because of the constant political challenges to government by a vigorous, more or less loyal, and highly heterogeneous "opposition."[7] The coercive ideological and political practices of both the Kenyatta and Moi regimes, far from containing opposition, have created the conditions for a "radical democratic politics" that constantly pushes for openness and prevents Kenya from becoming a purely repressive state.[8] This tension between repression and democracy, rather than a functioning parliamentary system or progressive capitalist policies, makes Kenya Africa's "success story"; this is what allows it to stave off economic or political disaster in spite of dire prognostications.

NEGOTIATING CHANGE

This subtle interplay of repressive and democratic forces in Kenyan political life cannot be understood by viewing society as fixed and unified. Rather, society should be perceived as under constant negotiation; this is as true for seemingly established nations like Canada as for the end products of colonial empire like Kenya and Nigeria.

To establish political hegemony, the state co-opts popular cultural themes like "development," "progress," Christian piety and "antitribal" nationalism. Through his invented "philosophy" of Nyayoism with its slogan "peace, love and unity," Moi has exhorted Kenyans to commit themselves to Christian and developmentalist virtues, and obedience to authority.[9] Any opposition to the regime's policy can thus be labeled as opposition to these values (Nyayo has now become an adjective denoting political correctness or loyalty). In this way, Moi's regime has been able to coax acquiescence from the populace and cast a cloak of legitimacy over the regime's suppression of dissent and its increasing control over KANU and Parliament.

However, cultural themes cannot be monopolized by any one group. In Kenya, the themes of piety, progress and national unity can just as easily be invested with different meanings and placed in the service of the opposition. For example, in the sermons of pro-democracy priests, Christian piety is stripped of the connotations of obedience and good behavior that Moi have given it and has been imbued with the principles of free will and egalitarianism, using a synthesis of the teachings of Jesus and the writings of John Stuart Mill.

The clergy may have enjoyed the moral authority

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[6]Lofchie, op. cit., pp. 210–211; see Kate Currie and Larry Ray, "State and Class in Kenya — Notes on the Cohesion of the Ruling Class," *Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 22, no. 4, (1984), pp. 559–593, for an insightful discussion of the strategies and competing interests of the industrial elite.

[7]For an investigation of "middle class politics" see Stamp, "Kenya: The Echoing Footsteps," pp. 130, 137.

[8]Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 1985).

[9]See Stephen Katz, "The Secession to Power and the Power of Succession: Nyayoism in Kenya," *Journal of African Studies,* vol. 12, no. 3 (Fall, 1985), pp. 155–161; and Stamp, "Kenya: The Echoing Footsteps, pp. 116–117; see also Daniel arap Moi, *Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles* (London; Macmillan, 1986) for the President's full exposition of his ideas.

to engage freely in political debate while remaining relatively immune from reprisal, but ordinary Kenyans have had to be more circumspect. Throughout the 1980's, KANU and the President used Kenya's formal political machinery to define the terms of political debate more and more narrowly and to determine whose voices could be heard. Parliament, which in the Kenyatta years had frequently been a forum for open debate, was reduced to being a mouthpiece for an increasingly imperious KANU leadership. Parliamentarians who had the temerity to speak out against the government or KANU were severely castigated, were called on to resign or were ostracized.

It is not surprising therefore that Kenyans turned to every nonpolitical forum available in order to express opposition or fight for their interests. Since the political arena was emptied of politics, the political appeared in different guises.

THE PRIESTS AND THE PARTY

Kenya's liberation theology was launched in August, 1986, at a pastors' conference of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) in response to KANU's abolition of secret balloting. The 1,200 clergy who attended issued a press release condemning the party's unanimous resolution at its annual meeting the week before to introduce preliminary polls and the queuing system of voting for all future parliamentary and local elections. In the months that followed, Bishop Muge and another Anglican bishop, John Okullu, asserted their right to speak out "when God-given liberties are violated." Muge said that:

> It is the role of the church to stand up against the pressures of totalitarianism in the name of one-party systems and against the detention of political opponents without trial.

Okullu defended himself and his colleagues against vituperative attacks by KANU leaders and the President's allegation that the clergy were working for foreign interests. "I have always sung and danced to the tune of my master, Jesus Christ," he declared.

Anglican, Presbyterian and Catholic priests continued to preach democracy from their pulpits over the next several years, while facing steady harassment from KANU and the government. Political pressure caused turmoil in the church hierarchies, and several churches withdrew from the NCCK. The downfall of the Communist regimes in East Europe in the latter half of 1989 rejuvenated

Kenya's liberation theology. On December 31, 1989, the Reverend Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa, in his New Year's sermon at St. Andrew's Church in Nairobi, asked political leaders to reconsider their preference for "imported" one-party systems. Njoya berated the "mistakes of the past decade," in which "evils were converted into habits and culture." Bishop Okullu, in a similar sermon, warned that "dictatorships" everywhere faced the same fate as those in East Europe. As 1990 progressed, the clergymen called for constitutional reform of KANU and a return to multiparty democracy; in June the country's 18 Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letter, and the Archbishop of the Anglican church, Manasse Kuria, called for an independent commission to overhaul KANU.

By this time, the entire country had caught the spirit of the debate. From April until the crackdown in July, the arguments for and against a multiparty system raged. The government and KANU officials defended Kenya's one-party system on the grounds that a multiparty system is divisive and leads to fragmentation along ethnic lines (a proposition that African thinkers have argued in the past). The United States ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, added fuel to the fire by announcing that the United States Congress was considering linking foreign aid to political reform. When the politicians Matiba and Rubia entered the fray in June, they immediately became the targets of government and party wrath. The President toured the country, accusing the multiparty advocates of being "mere tribalists."

Kenya's liberation theology achieved at least part of its objective. Although the regime responded to the uproar with typically repressive measures, it was forced by public pressure to respond to the call for reform. The committee chaired by Vice President Saitoti and the President's endorsement of a more democratic structure for the party vindicated the efforts of the churchmen.

A WIDOW'S ORDEAL

The most fascinating instance of politics in another guise was a battle between a Kikuyu widow and her Luo husband's clan, fought in the courts and the media for five months in 1987.[10] S. M. Otieno, a prominent criminal lawyer, died intestate

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[10]This account of the burial is based on Patricia Stamp, "Burying Otieno: The Politics of Gender and Ethnicity in Kenya," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, vol. 16, no. 4 (Summer, 1991).

Sub-Saharan Africa has recently seen a flurry of democratic openings and popular demand for an end to authoritarian rule. This author notes, however, that "many obstacles remain to creating democracy and maintaining political liberalization in Africa."

Building Democracy in Africa

By Jon Kraus

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IN 1989 and 1990, many African leaders faced widespread demonstrations and demands that they alter economic austerity policies and allow multiparty politics and elections. Protests occurred in countries as disparate as Mozambique and Zaire, Gabon and Zambia, Madagascar and Guinea, Benin and Algeria. Incumbent governments responded with repression, evasion and, often, reluctant announcements that single-party systems would be dismantled and other political parties would be allowed to compete for power. In some countries, national consultative meetings were held at which a wide range of organizations discussed the future political system; elsewhere, committees drafted new constitutions.

Many African governments, however, have strongly resisted reduction of their authoritarian power, and others have made promises of reform that have turned out to be hoaxes. When President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire abolished his country's sole party and announced in response to protests that there would be three parties in the future, it was clear that there had been no change in a highly personalist form of authoritarian rule. Most Ethiopians view with cynicism President Mengistu Haile Mariam's announcement that he will permit opposition groups to participate in national politics. Mengistu's announcement was similar to those made in 1990 by the leaders of Chad, Somalia and Rwanda, who promised democratic reforms only because their rule had been weakened by armed insurrection.

Still, the widespread demands for democracy attest to the strength of the democratic impulse. What are the origins and significance of these movements toward political liberty and democracy? Will some movements be more successful than others?

Democratic systems have existed since independence in Botswana and Gambia and in the Indian Ocean state of Mauritius. In Senegal, democratic politics has slowly blossomed since it was introduced in 1976. Zimbabwe also saw a return to democracy with its independence in 1980, although President Robert Mugabe has long wanted to create a one-party system and sought to do so in 1990 after the merger of the country's two parties. (In August, 1990, a majority on the politburo of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union rejected Mugabe's plan for a one-party state, citing the failure of such regimes in Africa and East Europe.) Democratic systems have operated intermittently in Ghana, Nigeria, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Burkina Faso and Benin. In most cases, democratic systems became discredited and were succeeded by military rule, more rarely by single-party authoritarian regimes, and in a few instances by radical-populist, quasi-military regimes, as in Ghana and Burkina Faso.

Disillusionment and disappointment with democratic government have many sources.[1] First, the government or opposition or both were frequently accused of manipulating ethnic, religious or clan cleavages to seek political advantage. This occurred in Nigeria under the first and second republics and in Zimbabwe, where the majority Shona faced Ndebele reluctance to accept Shona power. It has also occurred in Sierra Leone, Somalia, Benin and Sudan, where periods of democratic rule have deepened the chasm between the Arab–Muslim north and the Christian-animist southern regions. Second, ruling parties and governments have been accused of abusing their power by employing thugs, committing electoral fraud and essentially violating democratic norms.[2]

Third, democratic politicians have been accused of incompetent economic management, although there is little evidence that their autocratic counterparts have been more effective. In particular, discontent with renewed experiments in democracy in Ghana and Nigeria after 1979 stemmed from government inability to stave off the effects of collapsing world commodity prices.

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[1] See country studies on Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Uganda in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries, Vol. 2: Africa* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Press, 1988); and Jon Kraus, "Political Party Failures and Political Responses in Ghana," in Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl, eds., *When Parties Fail* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 464–496.

[2] See the chapters on elections in Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Zaire, Kenya and Senegal in Fred Hayward, ed., *Elections in Independent Africa* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1987).

Fourth, many Africans have abandoned their faith in politicians because of rampant corruption. For example, in 1983 Nigerians learned about the misuse of $2.5 billion in import licenses by the minister of commerce, allegations of large bribes of legislators by a foreign firm and a government minister's announcement that Nigeria was losing about $1 billion a year in payroll fraud.[3]

Fifth, it often appeared to citizens that the politicians were a self-seeking, self-interested group uninterested in national needs. The constant jousting for power and leadership positions by opposition politicians in Ghana in 1970–1971 and 1981, in Nigeria in 1982–1983, in Somalia in the mid-1960's, and in Benin throughout the 1960's and early 1970's reduced popular faith that political leaders were aware of pressing social and national problems and that they could solve them.

Sixth, in many democratic as well as authoritarian regimes, social inequalities have increased. While not a result of democratic government, the high salaries and perquisites of legislators exemplified this inequality. In contrast, real wages for workers declined, roads became pocketed with potholes, public transportation broke down, and promised schools and clinics were not completed.

Nevertheless, many Africans still desire popular representation, government accountability and political freedom. Even under single-party rule, national assemblies continued to function in some countries. One example is Ghana from 1960 to 1966; during this period, assembly members became more critical of the government than they had been during civilian rule. In Nigeria a relatively free press has fought to survive under military rule. Union movements have asserted, with varying success, their independence and the interests of workers in Ghana, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Sudan and Benin.[4] Autonomous bar associations in Ghana, Nigeria and Sudan have protested infringements on civil and political rights by military regimes. These institutions remain incubators of democratic values.

Institutions like these also exist in countries that have had no postindependence democratic experience. In Kenya, Zambia, Algeria and Tunisia, one-party states have been in power since independence or shortly thereafter. But in Kenya in the 1970's, the National Assembly included highly critical Members of Parliament (MP's). Com-

petitive elections in the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) for parliamentary seats led to vigorous local campaigns and the regular defeat of a large percentage of MP's and ministers. In Zambia, too, the National Assembly has been critical at times of the single-party government of President Kenneth Kaunda and has sought policy changes. However, experiments with competitive elections within a single party have not helped to increase political freedoms in Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Gabon and Cameroon.

THE FORCE OF IDEOLOGY

What are the origins of the movements for liberalization and democratization among the nondemocratic countries in Africa?

Some observers have argued that growing demands for democracy and the collapse of Communist regimes in East Europe have led to a powerful renewal of democratic ideology. This resurgent ideology has animated protesters in African countries and has contributed to popular demands for democracy and multiparty politics. African leaders have also been shaken by the events in East Europe and are making liberalizing concessions to avoid wholesale rejection.[5]

What is the evidence that democratization has been precipitated by the renewal of democratic ideology? The idea of resurgent democracy has been important but not intrinsic to the changes in the five self-designated Marxist-Leninist regimes in Africa: Congo, Benin, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique. As was noted earlier, Ethiopia's government has barely changed; moreover, Mengistu's decision to open up the political system was sparked by armed insurrection in Eritrea and other provinces.

The changes in Mozambique and Angola are part of a long-term process. After prolonged agonizing, these two countries have moved to open their former single-party systems to political competition with their guerrilla enemies, the National Union for the Total Independence for Angola (UNITA) under Jonas Savimbi and the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Both regimes officially renounced Marxism-Leninism in 1989, but the collapse of Communist regimes in East Europe only helped make it easier for these two countries to pursue a previously determined course.

Benin's dramatic decision to allow multiparty elections in March, 1991, flows from economic and political collapse. And in Congo, the ruling Congolese Workers party renounced Marxism and adopted a social democratic platform because of severe economic weakness and externally supported economic liberalization.

[3]Larry Diamond, "Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism, and the Struggle for Democracy," in Larry Diamond et al., op. cit., p. 52.

[4]Bill Freund, *The African Worker* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[5]*West Africa* (London), May 7, 1990, p. 762; *African Research Bulletin* (political series), February 15, 1990, pp. 9563–9564.

Former Nigerian leader General Olusegun Obasanjo argued in April, 1990, that

the revolutionary changes that have taken place at breakneck speed in the socialist countries . . . have captured the imagination and compassion of the governments and peoples . . . [and] stimulated a dramatic surge of mass democratic demands and a heightening of elitist reformist maneuvers in many African countries.[6]

Undoubtedly, intellectuals, students and union leaders in Africa have been inspired by the events in East Europe to raise anew demands that many have made in the past. However, the cries throughout Africa for multiparty politics are new. And successful protests in one African country have stimulated protests in others. Hence, a resurgent democratic ideology and evidence that authoritarian regimes can be vanquished have helped precipitate the demands. Whether these changes are responsible for the level of popular pressure and leadership responses is another matter.

EXTERNAL LEVERAGE

It has been argued that the United States, France, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have a powerful new leverage over African states because of African economic weaknesses and geopolitical changes in East Europe and the Soviet Union. Western capitalist countries and the international financial institutions they control use the leverage of a triumphant capitalism to compel African countries to make changes they desire. Moreover, the Soviet Union and East Europe are no longer willing or able to provide the arms and economic assistance they previously offered, particularly to Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, which confront long-term civil wars.

This economic-political leverage does not force an authoritarian government to introduce political liberties and democratic practices. But if countries are desperate and face extreme instability, such leverage might motivate gradual reforms. Major Western aid donors work closely with the IMF and the World Bank to require the adoption of free market policies. African countries that once aggressively pursued nationalist and statist policies have introduced guarantees and incentives for private capital and plans to end controls.

A good example of this is Francophone Africa. With low rates of economic growth in Francophone Africa in the 1980's, French companies began disinvesting and reducing commercial activities. As one Francophone country after another experienced economic crises in 1989 and 1990, and as the French were pressed for additional aid, there was evidence that the French were telling African leaders in Gabon, Benin and Ivory Coast that they had to be responsive to the demands for liberal reforms. When the Benin government of President Mathieu Kérékou experienced one crisis after another in 1989 and 1990 because of its inability to pay civil servants, the price of new foreign loans in December, 1989, was government willingness to deal with critics demanding political reforms.

But demonstrations continued nonstop. In a few short months this led to the establishment of a national consultative congress that seized power and ended the single-party system, creating a new government in Benin. Leverage by outside actors facilitated Benin's political opening, but it was not the cause.

Another external factor that can affect a country's political system is outside intervention in a civil war. External aid to the opposition can affect a regime's national political and economic goals, its legitimacy and, in Mozambique's case, its very survival. Angola (with United States and South African support for UNITA), Mozambique (with the South African-financed MNR), and Ethiopia (with varying external support to rebel Ethiopian and Eritrean groups) have all suffered the internal effects of external intervention.

Because of the political and economic damage inflicted by war and reduced Soviet military support, Angola and Mozambique have looked increasingly to Western countries for economic assistance and for diplomatic help to reduce guerrilla attacks or South African assistance. In both Angola and Mozambique, by late 1990 the leaders were committed to allowing the opposition to participate in politics. In Angola, UNITA has stopped fighting; there were new parties and negotiations in Mozambique, where political and economic liberalization has been embraced more full than in Angola. In neither contry, however, has the government agreed on a political formula to deal with the guerrilla opposition.

ECONOMIC WEAKNESS

The extreme economic distress many African states suffered in the 1970's and 1980's has been widely documented. Between 1980 and 1989, the gross domestic product (GDP) in sub-Saharan African countries grew a mere 1 percent, a 2.2 percent decline in GDP per capita. Growth in export volume was nil during this period and real incomes plunged.

The economic crises were caused by plummeting world commodity prices between 1986 and 1990 and by the extraordinary levels of African debt and debt-service payments. In 1989, only 5 of 44

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[6]*West Africa,* May 7, 1990, p. 762.

sub-Saharan African states were not borrowers from the IMF; most operated under IMF stabilization or World Bank structural adjustment programs. That year, the poorest African countries were scheduled to pay on average 43 percent of their export earnings in debt service; the higher income countries paid 51 percent.[7] In the late 1980's, stabilization and structural adjustment programs forced most African countries to pursue austerity programs — reducing real government spending, severely cutting state spending, laying off civil servants and other state workers, reducing educational expenditures and restricting public services like education, health and water while charging more for them.

In Ivory Coast, demonstrations and strikes, focused largely on economic grievances, were soon transformed into demands for political liberty and multiparty politics. In Benin, Algeria, Congo, Zambia, Gabon, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, Ghana and (to a lesser degree) Kenya, the most significant source of popular political demands has been economic distress.

PROGRESS AND REMAINING OBSTACLES

There were some substantial gains in political liberties in African states in 1989 and 1990 and early 1991. In 1991, in Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, incumbent governments were voted out of power. In Gabon, free albeit disputed elections in 1990 were held in which the previous ruling party returned a bare majority in the legislature. Moreover, the new governments include members of opposition parties. In Ivory Coast, competitive elections with opposing parties were held for the first time in more than 30 years in November, 1990. On March 10, 1991, Benin held free, competitive legislative and presidential elections.

In these and other states the pressures for political liberties had led to the legalization of opposition parties and the renewal of an opposition press. Governments in Mali, Guinea, Cameroon, Tanzania, Niger, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Togo, among others, held constitutional review commissions and permitted opposition parties. While the changes in these states were slow and often reluctant, real political openings were occurring. Moreover, in those states where leaders had strongly resisted political concessions over the years, there were major insurrections, a lesson not lost on other leaders. In Liberia, President Samuel K. Doe was overthrown by armed groups and executed; and in Somalia, President Mohammed Siad Barre was driven from power after a prolonged insurrection that devastated the country.

[7]World Bank, *World Debt Tables, 1989–1990: Supplemental Report* (Washington, D.C., 1990).

Many obstacles remain to creating democracy and maintaining political liberty in Africa. First, the rulers in several important countries refuse to give way to pressure for political rights and democratic practices. These include Ghana under Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings and Kenya under President Daniel arap Moi. In recent years both countries have been among the more successful economically in Africa so political protests have lacked popular support.

A second obstacle is the clear evidence of continuing and powerful resistance to any significant political changes and the continued use of political repression. Examples of this include Mali, Niger, Zaire, Togo and Guinea; in Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Gabon, significant reforms have been instituted but the regimes resist their full implementation.

Third, even if political liberty is reintroduced and opposition parties are permitted, ruling parties in former one-party states may retain their hegemony in society and state; this has occurred in Senegal since 1976. Political freedoms are limited, party activities frustrated and state resources manipulated to the incumbent party's advantage. Political leaders who have come under powerful political pressures to permit reforms may be adapting and maintaining their hegemony under a slightly varied political formula.

Last, the manifold economic crises, the most powerful force generating political and economic opposition, are no more likely to be resolved by a democratic regime than by an authoritarian regime. Economic abuses might not be so massive or so naked under a democratic regime, but democratic pressures are likely to compel governments to abort economic austerity, and to gut or minimize structural economic adjustment. Under pressure from unions, governments in Gabon and Congo have already abandoned the privatization of state enterprises because state workers feared dismissal by new owners. One of the major reasons for Africa's economic malaise has been the unwillingness of governments to limit expenditures to an amount that approximates their financial resources. ∎

> *"The timing of [Namibia's] independence, coming in the wake of the breakup of the Social-*
> *ist regimes in East Europe and changes in the Soviet Union, is unfortunate. Namibia must*
> *compete for resources at a time when other needs appear more critical to the leaders of the*
> *capitalist world. Thus after a reasonably positive start Namibia could falter because of condi-*
> *tions far beyond its political influence."*

Namibia's First Year of Independence

BY KENNETH W. GRUNDY
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IT is amazing how the American public tends to lose interest in stories that have been long in the news. Before its independence on March 21, 1990, Namibia had been the subject of international contention.[1] It had been on the agenda of the United Nations (UN) virtually since that organization's founding. From 1946 to 1989, South Africa, which administered the territory (formerly called South-West Africa), had managed to defy at least six rulings of the International Court of Justice and innumerable UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Out of desperation, the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) launched a guerrilla war for independence that spilled over into Angola and lasted from 1966 until 1989. The long negotiations that led to South Africa's withdrawal and culminated in Namibian independence trained world media attention on Namibia that has since dissipated.

Namibia's experiences leading up to independence did not make observers hopeful. The final 23 years of rule from Pretoria were marked by a spasmodic guerrilla war that took the lives of more than 1 percent of the population.[2] In addition, many Angolans were caught in South Africa's destabilization campaign and its cross-border raids to neutralize SWAPO and its sanctuaries in southern Angola.[3] South African rule left Namibia with an apartheid system that played on racial differences, heightened ethnic divisions among the black population, and put most of the land, resources and wealth in the hands of some 80,000 white settlers and administrators, and foreign, mostly South African-based, corporations.

The war and changing regional and global power configurations forced South Africa to seek an accommodation in the region. South Africa's leaders realized that their policy in southern Africa, although militarily impressive, was politically bankrupt and economically counterproductive. Moreover, their chief source of leverage in the region, the South African armed forces, required modernization. A hostile world community supporting a UN arms embargo successfully inhibited that modernization. In short, Pretoria was compelled to come to terms with Namibian independence.

THE YEAR OF TRANSITION

UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), which offered a plan for Namibia's transition to independence, and a later series of agreements formed the basis of the eventual settlement. Major breakthroughs occurred in 1988. These included the Protocol of Geneva, which was signed by South Africa, Cuba and Angola in August, 1988. The protocol set a timetable for the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola and South African troops from Namibia and confined SWAPO troops to positions north of the sixteenth parallel, some 120 miles inside Angola. The Protocol of Brazzaville, which was signed on December 13, 1988, by the same three countries, made April 1, 1989, the implementation date for Resolution 435. The signatories also agreed subsequently to sign a tripartite agreement, and Cuba and Angola said they would sign a separate bilateral agreement that would set in motion the peace process for the entire area.

On December 22, 1988, in New York, South Africa formally agreed to end its administration of Namibia and to carry out the UN plan for Namibian independence. Beginning April 1, 1989, the

[1] See Kenneth W. Grundy, "Namibia in International Politics," *Current History*, vol. 81, no. 473 (March, 1983); and Virginia Curtin Knight, "Namibia's Transition to Independence," *Current History*, vol. 88, no. 538 (May, 1989); for a history of Namibia, see John Dugard, *The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

[2] Tony Weaver, "The South African Defence Force in Namibia," in Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, eds., *War and Society: The Militarization of South Africa* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989), pp. 90–102.

[3] See Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbors* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); Robert S. Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985); and Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilization Report* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), especially chapter 5.

UN would oversee the transition, which would start with an immediate cease-fire and lead to a November, 1989, election for a Namibian constituent assembly. Although SWAPO was not a party to the accords, its president, Sam Nujoma, accepted the cease-fire and independence process early in 1989.

Throughout this process the United States and the Soviet Union actively "observed," pushing their various clients and "allies" toward compromise. United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker worked doggedly to make a resolution of the area's problems the denouement of his long tenure in office.

The transition nearly collapsed on the first day of the cease-fire when some 1,500 SWAPO fighters crossed into Namibia from Angola. They were immediately engaged by South African troops, and about 350 were killed. The origins of this battle are hotly disputed. According to South Africa, the SWAPO forces sought to enter Namibia fully armed in order to intimidate Namibians and thereby to influence the electoral process. In South Africa's view, SWAPO was in flagrant violation of the independence agreements, and the UN's decision to sanction the redeployment of South African troops in the border area was entirely correct.

SWAPO denied initiating the fighting and said its troops were under strict instructions to abide by the cease-fire then in force. SWAPO leaders claim that there was a discrepancy between the August, 1988, Geneva Protocol (which decreed that SWAPO forces must remain north of the sixteenth parallel), to which SWAPO had not been a party, and Resolution 435, which provided for the supervision of SWAPO bases inside Namibia by the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) during the transition period; SWAPO claims that its troops were merely reporting to UNTAG at the Namibian bases. SWAPO president Nujoma had sent a letter to UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar on August 12, 1988, confirming that SWAPO had "agreed to comply with the commencement of the cessation of all hostile acts," but making no reference to the sixteenth parallel. The dispute turned on whether Nujoma tacitly acceded to the Geneva Protocol in the letter, and whether Resolution 435 had been superseded by the 1988 agreements.

South African forces quickly subdued the SWAPO troops. Most were dispersed or fled to Angola after Pretoria agreed to withdraw its security forces from the northern Namibian border area to allow the SWAPO fighters to surrender at UN assembly points or to escape. The peace process was salvaged.

From early April until November, the UN special representative, Martii Ahtisaari; the com-mander of the UNTAG military forces, General Prem Chand; and the South African administrator general of South-West Africa/Namibia, Louis Pinaar, worked together to provide conditions for a peaceful election of a Namibian constituent assembly. Procedural and substantive questions were negotiated, including who should be permitted to vote, the registration process for voters and parties, the conduct and supervision of elections, the elimination of fraud and intimidation, and the counting of votes. Also discussed were the respective roles and responsibilities of the UN forces, the South-West Africa Territory Force (SWATF, formerly the South-West African army), the South African forces, partisan campaigners and observers, external monitoring teams from various organizations and UN member states. The issue of amnesty and the return of exiles and refugees, prisoners of war, and political prisoners and political detainees held by SWAPO outside Namibia was debated as well.

Before the election it had been agreed that approval of a new constitution would require a two-thirds majority (the votes of 48 members in the constituent assembly). Thus the question on most minds was not who would win the election for a constituent assembly — virtually everyone agreed that SWAPO would gain a majority — but whether SWAPO would capture two-thirds of the seats, and if not, what it would do. Coalition building started soon after the cease-fire and picked up momentum after the election, in which some 97 percent of the registered voters cast ballots. The results made Sam Nujoma the President of Namibia but left SWAPO seven seats short of a two-thirds majority. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) and other white-backed parties gained enough seats to give them an effective veto in the assembly (see the table on page 215 for election results).

Accusations of foul play were frequent, and complaints of intimidation were leveled against many candidates, but the campaign, the voting, and the work of the constituent assembly went smoothly and with a surprising degree of cooperation, compromise and goodwill. Instead of permanent alliances being forged, however, a pattern of ad hoc deals marked the proceedings on specific constitutional issues. The parties seemed committed to multiparty democracy, helping to draft a constitution protecting fundamental human and political rights, and they took a pragmatic approach to state involvement in the economy. The transition to a constitutional government was unexpectedly effective and efficient; UNTAG's role cost only $373.4 million, $42.8 million less than the General Assembly had budgeted.

But dark clouds still hang over the electoral pro-

cess. Voting largely followed ethnic and racial lines. SWAPO, for example, garnered 95 percent of the Ovambo vote, creating the potential for division and suspicion among non-Ovambo Namibians. Action Christian National support came mainly from those who ran Namibia before 1978 — white Afrikaners — and from German speakers, right-wing farmers, bureaucrats and artisans. The Federal Convention of Namibia, a party of mixed-race Rehoboths, has threatened a unilateral declaration of independence for its homeland. The DTA, which includes many whites, has almost no following in Ovamboland and tends to speak for a variety of ethnic groups fearful of domination by an Ovambo-based SWAPO.

Whether these partisan group identities will soften with time depends on how SWAPO exercises its majority role. If the voting patterns of 1989 hold in the 1991 local elections, opposition parties can be expected to carry 16 of Namibia's 23 regions. This might give SWAPO reason to reconsider its commitment to multiparty democracy.

THE NEW NAMIBIA AND RECONCILIATION

The SWAPO government's theme so far has been reconciliation. The constitution shows that SWAPO does not intend to ride roughshod over opposition parties. It is perhaps the most democratic constitution in Africa.[4] A bill of rights, guarantees of freedom of speech (which cannot be derogated, even under martial law) and freedom of the press, an independent judiciary and legal obligations to improve the disadvantaged sectors of the population are written into the country's constitution.

Perhaps because it won the elections comfortably, although not overwhelmingly, SWAPO is wary of taking too forceful action without a broader mandate. SWAPO has honored its commitment to freedom of the press, sought to curb human rights abuses — including some by its own ex-guerrillas — and in Parliament seems inclined to promote consensus across party lines on sensitive issues. The DTA seems pleased with this orientation, but its long history of collaboration with South Africa and the war effort against SWAPO may make reconciliation with the DTA unpopular among SWAPO's radical supporters.

The new SWAPO government faced problems initially. At independence the government had only 1,200 policemen to patrol Namibia's 800,000 square kilometers, so it hastily recruited a force of border guards from among demobilized members

[4]*Africa Research Bulletin* (political series), vol. 27, no. 3 (April 15, 1990), p. 9621; for a contrary view, see Bruce Fein in *The Washington Times,* May 8, 1990.

[5]Colleen Lowe Morna, "No Place at Home," *Africa Report,* vol. 35, no. 5 (November–December, 1990), pp. 59–62.

Results of the Namibian Elections			
Party	Seats	Votes	Percentage
South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)	41	384,567	57.3
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)	21	191,532	28.6
United Democratic Front (UDF)	4	37,874	5.6
Action Christian National (ACN)	3	23,728	3.5
Others	3	33,129	5.0
TOTALS	72	670,830	100

Source: Data for the 1989 Namibian elections is from the *Africa Research Bulletin* (political series), vol. 26, no. 11 (December 15, 1989), p. 9473.

of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO's military wing. The border guards frequently harassed and roughed up DTA officials and South African tourists. These politicized border forces have been replaced by regular troops from Namibia's national army. According to observers, human rights abuses by soldiers and police, so common under South African rule, have become less frequent. Even a DTA official accused of firing an automatic rifle at President Nujoma's aircraft as it was about to land in Oshakati was charged and then released by a local magistrate on bail that was set at only about $390.

Not everyone is pleased with the reconciliation as carried out by the SWAPO government. SWAPO zealots who sacrificed a great deal to bring the new government to power are disappointed by the lack of more noticeable change. Others, especially the leaders of some of the ethnic minorities, fear repression and economic disadvantage for their people. And many diehards in the white community simply cannot accept a black government, regardless of its political orientation.

Much of the dissatisfaction of the SWAPO loyalists and returning exiles (about 43,400 Namibians who had scattered to 46 countries) stems from the country's economic performance. There is little change in Namibia's economic fortunes; unemployment is probably higher than before independence. Cutbacks in the bloated state bureaucracies (Namibia supported 11 racially segregated "homelands" under the South Africans) and the armed forces have left few opportunities for pro-SWAPO returnees. Reconciliation in practice means that no white civil servants have been fired and that equal numbers of former PLAN and SWATF troopers have been brought into the pared-down defense force, which has 10,000 troops.

As a result, some 57 percent of the returnees are unemployed and only 6 percent have regular jobs.[5] Many lack skills, although the skilled have also been denied work. White employers tend not to hire returnees because they consider them too

politicized or because they refuse to recognize their educational or training qualifications since they are not South African-certified. Past labor patterns have thus been perpetuated.

Even those who are fortunate enough to have jobs complain. Inflated worker expectations have led to a wave of militant and wildcat strikes in mining centers and in other industries. The pro-SWAPO National Union of Namibian Workers has been unable to control the strikers. "Other than a brightly colored flag," said one Western diplomat, "there is very little to distinguish the old South-West Africa from the new Namibia."[6]

André du Pisani, research director at the South African Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg, believes the practical implementation of reconciliation is "a means of harmonizing the interests of the new political elite with those of the old rulers."[7] In other words, under the guise of racial reconciliation, the SWAPO leadership is taking on the role of a status quo elite determined to consolidate its position and to enjoy the perquisites of power so long denied it. Mutters of "sell-out" are rife. Many nonpolitical technocrats have been appointed to key ministries — agriculture, finance and planning among them. And the new chief of police actively served the South African government before independence.

Outside Ovamboland and Windhoek, support for SWAPO is thin. Some of the former ethnic territories have governments that were put in place during the years Pretoria ruled Namibia. Some of these have hinted at secession and civil war; other, more subtle resistance by traditional leaders still simmers there. Many fear that the loss of South African protection leaves them vulnerable to central government dictates.

The whites, who have been the most obvious beneficiaries of reconciliation, are generally satisfied with the SWAPO government. So far there has been no white flight, although some whites left before an independence settlement was reached. The government has abandoned the Marxist rhetoric it used in exile; its talk of a mixed economy and free market-based policy decisions seems to have placated critics in the business community.

For some whites, nothing less than a return to white rule is acceptable. These extremists regard the change in the official language from Afrikaans to English as ominous. Extremists have been im-

plicated in sabotage attempts and plots to overthrow the government. Three months after independence, shots were fired at the homes of Defense Minister Peter Mueshihange and Home Affairs Minister Hifikepunye Pohamba. On August 6, 1990, the editorial office of *The Namibian,* a pro-SWAPO newspaper, was attacked by unidentified people throwing phosphorous grenades. The attack followed a report in the paper about a top-security document alleging that 500 dissidents planned to overthrow the government. According to the article, the dissidents had links to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA, a guerrilla group fighting the Angolan government), SWATF troopers and police allegedly financed by the United States. One of the dissidents presumably contacted the Namibian security forces. The coup allegations and the August 6 bombing shattered the uneasy calm of reconciliation.[8]

On September 2, 1990, six young white men (German and Afrikaans speakers) were arrested after large quantities of arms, ammunition and explosives were found in several Windhoek homes. It appears that the weapons had been stolen from the Luipaardsvallei army base and the police armory in Windhoek. There was no immediate connection with right-wing groups, yet most observers sensed trouble. In the summer of 1990, substantial quantities of ammunition and hand grenades had been found in homes of white residents in the northern Caprivi Strip.

Critics of SWAPO and even some moderates within SWAPO were particularly alarmed by the appointment in October, 1990, of Major General Solomon Hawala as army commander in the Namibian Defense Force, the third highest-ranking position in the Defense Force hierarchy. Several opposition parties and various human rights and church organizations challenged the wisdom of this appointment. As "Comrade Jesus," General Hawala supervised the SWAPO exile purges in which hundreds died. According to SWAPO members once held in detention by their own organization, Hawala became SWAPO security chief during the party's purges of 1976. He was later PLAN deputy commander in charge of intelligence and counterintel-

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[6]Quoted in John Battersby, "Democracy Takes Root in Namibia," *The Christian Science Monitor,* September 12, 1990.

[7]Quoted in the *Weekly Mail,* October 5-11, 1990, p. 9.

[8]Quoted in Colleen Lowe Morna, "Reactionaries and Reconciliation," *Africa Report,* vol. 35, no. 5 (November–December, 1990), p. 62; see also *Africa Research Bulletin* (political series), vol. 27, no. 8 (September 15, 1990), pp. 9803–9804.

Negotiations to end the guerrilla war in Mozambique may succeed in 1991, and the country's Marxist–Leninist government has decided to allow multiparty elections. Positive developments, however, are overshadowed by an economy that is in shambles. New economic programs are in place, but "improving the nontraditional export sector of the economy and increasing foreign investment will take time and, above all, peace."

Mozambique's Search for Stability

By Virginia Curtin Knight
Consulting Editor, Current History

O N December 1, 1990, representatives of the Mozambican government and the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) agreed in negotiations in Rome to a limited cease-fire. Although the talks broke off in mid-February, 1991, the attempt at a cease-fire was a small but important first step in ending a 15-year guerrilla war that has devastated rural areas, leaving millions homeless, and has seriously undermined economic growth in urban areas.

The destabilization caused by the war, coupled with years of drought, floods and destructive government policy, have ravaged Mozambique. Danger from attack, inadequate transportation and a dearth of markets have left peasant farmers unable or unwilling to produce enough to feed the country's population. Hundreds of thousands of farmers have fled to the safety of district centers, patrolled corridors, urban areas and refugee camps. The farmers who remain on the land provide a mere 10 percent of the country's food needs, leaving Mozambique dependent on international aid for the remaining 90 percent. In 1990 foreign donors provided $1 billion in food and development aid.

United Nations (UN) officials estimate that of Mozambique's 16 million people, between 2 million and 3 million are internal refugees who cannot be reached by any assistance; 2 million are internal refugees who can be reached by assistance; and 1 million have fled across the country's border to Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe.[1]

MNR guerrillas have cut power lines, attacked commuter trains and raided villages only miles from major urban centers. The MNR intermittently blacked out Maputo, the capital, for 53 days in 1990, and continued to cut off power to the city in

early 1991. Abandoned children live in deserted automobiles or under cement railings along the city's bayside promenade. In Beira, Mozambique's second largest city, the inadequate and poorly maintained sewer system backs up onto the city's potholed streets. Food is scarce; only vegetables from the small gardens surrounding the cities are in abundant supply. Prawns and cashews, once plentiful in the local markets, cannot be found there, since almost all of them are sold abroad, accounting for nearly 70 percent of the country's exports.

ABANDONING MARXISM

In 1989, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), then the only legal political party in Mozambique, abandoned its Marxist-Leninist orientation in favor of liberalized trade and investment policies, in order to attract desperately needed economic and development assistance. Most significant, the party decided at its fifth party congress in July, 1989, to draft a new constitution that guaranteed a multiparty political system.[2]

A Western military analyst commented, "If it hadn't been for the MNR, this government would not be doing what it is now. The MNR accomplished its objectives—multiparty democracy and capitalism."[3] But the price was high.

Anyone who hasn't been in Mozambique has a difficult time imagining how bad it really is. One assumes no civilized person would target a child. In Mozambique that is not the case. These are not accidents when you move into a village in the middle of the night and you sack a health post, you seek out the one or two medical people and either kidnap or kill them, or you sack a school and you grab children—in many cases to be your load bearers. You are talking about a kind of barbarity that is difficult to imagine. . . .

So Charles Lyon, a United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) official in Mozambique, described the activities of the MNR. He continued, "The consistent attacks by [the

[1] Interview with Sam Barnes, United Nations Development Program official, Maputo, November 27, 1990.

[2] For a discussion of the congress's decision, see Merle Bowen, "Economic Crisis in Mozambique," *Current History,* May, 1990.

[3] Interview with a Western military analyst, Maputo, December 2, 1990.

MNR] on social structures have brought Mozambique to its knees."[4]

The situation created by the MNR undoubtedly forced the government's hand. However, President and FRELIMO leader Joaquim Alberto Chissano called the MNR's bluff by meeting its demands and, going one better, inviting the MNR into the political process. After years of taking captives and terrorizing the rural population, the MNR must put aside its brutal tactics and form political alliances if it is to compete as a legitimate political organization.

THE NEW CONSTITUTION

In January, 1990, Chissano made public the first draft of the new constitution prepared by the People's Assembly, which was then presented to the people in meetings held throughout the country. Chissano claims that 3 million people participated in the discussions of the draft constitution.[5]

After the national debate, FRELIMO's Politburo recommended changes in the draft constitution. The party reversed its decision to eliminate state ownership of land because of widespread objections to private land ownership. Peasants feared that the best land would end up in the hands of rich farmers if land could be bought and sold; the peasants would then be forced to farm marginal land. The draft constitution was revised to grant all Mozambican citizens the right to use land, which is owned and regulated by the state; the land may not be sold, mortgaged or alienated. A farmer may own a cashew tree, but not the land it grows on. If and when peace comes and the millions of dislocated people return home, the government will determine who is entitled to land, taking into consideration inheritance and occupancy. The Assembly voted against describing the economy as a "market economy" in the new constitution; instead, the constitution says that there are four types of property ownership: state ownership, cooperatives, private property and joint ventures.

Because the draft version of the constitution did not provide for freedom of information, journalists petitioned the President to include constitutional guarantees for the media. The final version included clauses guaranteeing freedom of expression, freedom of the press and the right to information; censorship was explicitly outlawed. Curbs on the press could be imposed by the Supreme Mass Communications Council, which is to be created by the Assembly to guarantee these freedoms.

Although most Mozambicans favored retaining a one-party state, the Politburo overruled the Central Committee and recommended multiparty elections. Thus the new constitution guarantees a multiparty state with universal suffrage, direct representation, secret balloting and periodic elections. The President is to be elected by a simple majority; if no candidate wins a majority, a runoff election must be held. The President may serve for no more than three consecutive five-year terms. The first presidential elections are scheduled for late 1991.

Members of the Assembly (no longer called the People's Assembly) will face elections every five years. The President will appoint the Prime Minister, who will in turn appoint the Council of Ministers, the designated "government of the republic" that is responsible for implementing presidential and Assembly policies. Provincial governors and officials will be appointed by the government.

The new constitution empowers the Assembly to create a Constitutional Council, which will make the final decision on whether actions taken by state organs are legal; the President, the president of the Assembly, the Prime Minister and the attorney general may appeal to the Council to declare an act unconstitutional. The Council will also supervise and validate elections.

The debate over the constitution's clauses on Mozambican nationality was between those who would date Mozambican nationality from the Portuguese conquest in the fifteenth century and those who would date it from the 1960's and 1970's, when the struggle for independence was most intense. But in essence the debate was about whether people of Portuguese descent and former Portuguese settlers (possibly now living in South Africa) should be able to return to claim nationality and property.

Lieutenant General Antonio Hama Thai, chief of staff of the armed forces, boiled the argument down to this: "Mozambicans by origin are all those who were called natives in the colonial epoch."[6] Transport Minister Armando Guebuza also took a hard-line approach, advocating that nationality be granted only to people whose ancestors had lived in Mozambique for several generations and to those born in the country. President Chissano warned that this might discriminate against hundreds of thousands of black Mozambicans living in neighboring countries. Guebuza's proposal, which was seen by many as an attempt to check the power of white, Asian and mixed-race Mozambicans, was defeated, despite support from Security Minister Mariano Matsinhe.

The Assembly finally agreed that "nationality by origin" would be granted to "anyone born in the country, provided that one of [his] parents was also

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[4]Interview with Charles Lyon, UNICEF official, Maputo, November 23, 1990.

[5]Press conference by President Chissano, Maputo, November 30, 1990.

[6]*Mozambique File* (Maputo), November, 1990, p. 8.

born in the country, or [his] parents are unknown or stateless." Anyone who resided in Mozambique before independence on June 25, 1975, or who took up residence within the succeeding 90 days also qualifies for citizenship.

After three weeks of separate votes on each of the 206 articles, the Assembly unanimously approved the constitution, which took effect November 30, 1990.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Legislation passed on December 22, 1990, explicitly outlaws regionalist or secessionist parties and parties organized along racial, ethnic or religious lines. Political parties with Christian titles are also forbidden. To qualify as a political party, a group must present a list of 1,100 supporters, with 100 signatures drawn from each of the provinces.

The Liberal Democratic party of Mozambique (PALMO) is the first new party to emerge inside the country. PALMO has not yet selected a presidential candidate but it has issued a 24-page program critical of the influential role whites, Asians and mixed-race people have played in the FRELIMO government. PALMO's founders are black professionals who want better opportunities for blacks throughout the country, especially for those in north and central Mozambique, regions that the party says have been neglected in favor of the south. Another party, the exiled Democratic party for the Liberation of Mozambique (PADELIMO) announced on December 13, 1990, that it would contest the 1991 elections. The party was formed in Kenya in 1979 by Joaquim José Nyota, who had defected from FRELIMO.

With the recent changes in party direction, other FRELIMO members may form new parties. The Marxist–Leninist wing may form a Socialist party, and others may create a social democratic party, possibly in association with the Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Beira, Jaime´ Goncalves, and other Church leaders played a vital role in bringing the government and the MNR together to negotiate.

The MNR will probably contest the elections, if it can make the leap from terrorist group to legal political party. The Mozambique National Union (UNAMO), which split from the MNR in 1987 because of the MNR's bias toward Ndau speakers, is more likely to participate in the political process. Gimo Phiri led the breakaway group, establishing its headquarters in Malawi; UNAMO's Mozambican leader is Carlos Reis. The group has held small meetings and has published its program. It will probably set up its headquarters in Nampula, which is in the predominantly Muslim north of the country. Other potential opposition leaders include

Principal Railways of Southern Africa

From Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., *The Economics of Apartheid* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990), p. 86.

Maximo Dias, a lawyer of Indian descent, who leads the Mozambican National Movement (MONAMO), and Domingos Arouca, the country's first lawyer, who lives in exile in Lisbon.

POLITICS AND PEACE

The day after the new constitution took effect, negotiators in Rome announced that the Mozambican government and the MNR had agreed to a limited cease-fire. Under the terms of the accord, between 7,000 and 10,000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique who are guarding the oil pipeline from Beira to Mutare, Zimbabwe, are confined to two narrow transport corridors. The Zimbabwean military presence has been a major obstacle to peace talks because troops were carrying out operations against the MNR well beyond the corridors; as of January 5, 1991, however, all Zimbabwean troops are confined to two strips, six kilometers wide, straddling the Beira pipeline and the Limpopo railroad that runs from Zimbabwe to Maputo.

In exchange for the restriction on Zimbabwean troops, MNR spokesman Raúl Domingues agreed that the MNR would halt all military action in the two corridors. The cease-fire is being monitored by a joint commission made up of representatives from the MNR, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, the United

States, the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Italy, Zambia, Kenya and Congo. The commission is based on Maputo, and the delegates have diplomatic status.

With troops from Zimbabwe confined to the corridors, MNR guerrillas have shifted their activity northward. They have attacked truck convoys traveling between Malawi and Zimbawe through Mozambique's Tete province, through which nearly 60 percent of Malawi's trade had been passing. Several drivers and their passengers have been killed and vehicles have been destroyed. (The Tete and Nacala transportation corridor and the corridor between Nacala, in northern Mozambique, and Malawi were not included in the December accord because of an unofficial understanding that the MNR would not disturb Malawi's links to Zimbabwe and the sea.) In mid-January, 1991, the 215-mile-long road through Tete was closed, just as the World Food Program was about to begin shipping 32,000 tons of maize from Zimbabwe to feed 820,000 refugees in Malawi. The Harare-based Southern African Research and Documentation Center (SARDC) believes that the MNR attacked the corridor because Malawi refused to allow the MNR to use Malawi as a rear base.

With the withdrawal of Zimbabwean forces to the corridors, heavy fighting has also been reported in Mozambique's Gorongosa Mountains as the MNR tried and (as of early February) failed to retake its old headquarters.[7] During 1990 the MNR lost control of vast areas of Mozambique, especially in Sofala and Zambezia provinces, and in the Niassa and Tete regions along the Malawi border. Opposition came from an unexpected source. UN official Sam Barnes estimates that in the first four months of 1990, nearly 100,000 people in Zambezia province were liberated from the MNR by young men armed with spears and faith in their own invincibility. Under the leadership and protection of traditional healer Manuel Antonio, the peasant armies they formed chased away MNR guerrillas and released their captives. Freed from MNR control, people have flooded into the district capitals, where they wait for aid agencies to provide food and clothing.

ECONOMIC PRESSURE

Since 1987 the FRELIMO government has gradually moved away from Socialist economics and a centralized political system. The pace has quickened recently as traditional allies like the Soviet Union have become less supportive, and donors have grown weary of sending aid to a country where supplies are siphoned off before they

[7]Colonel Clever Chiramba, commander of Zimbabwe 3 Brigade, in *The Herald* (Harare), February 2, 1991.

reach the people and where the army is accused of corruption and incompetence.

In December, 1990, the government's contract for petroleum from the Soviet Union expired. Before the political changes in the Soviet Union, Mozambique received 75 percent of its petroleum needs under a Soviet "favored customer" arrangement. The country now owes the Soviet Union between $300 million and $400 million in oil payments. Under the new agreement Mozambique must exchange nontraditional exports, like shoes, clothing and textiles, for Soviet oil. The end to preferential trading has created a crisis in Mozambique, since it is unable to pay for its oil. The Mozambique National Planning Commission projects a foreign currency shortfall of 15 percent if the 1990 level of oil imports is maintained. According to the SARDC, the war in the Persian Gulf could raise the shortfall to as much as 40 percent.

To qualify for low-interest loans and low-cost development programs, in 1987 the Mozambican government implemented measures required by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. These have hit poor urban dwellers hardest. An estimated 60 percent of the population lives in "absolute poverty," yet the economic recovery program is removing subsidies on all basic goods and services. Unemployment has also increased, the number of civil service employees is being reduced and state-owned enterprises are for sale.

In an attempt to earn hard currency, nontraditional exports are being emphasized, and the Mozambican currency was devalued from 40 meticals to the United States dollar in 1986 to 930 meticals to the dollar in 1990. In 1990 the government established a dual exchange rate, which gave hard-currency holders 1,700 meticals to the dollar, thus competing with the black market.

A series of strikes in 1990 and early 1991 showed the impact of the economic program. In 1990 rail and harbor workers, hospital employees and teachers struck to protest their low salaries. The new year saw strikes over wages by textile workers, train engineers and journalists. The annual per capita income in Mozambique is $150, one of the lowest in the world.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Faced with tremendous unemployment, the government is courting investors from South Africa and Zimbabwe. In 1988, South Africa opened a multimillion-dollar trade center in Maputo, and

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"The political disintegration of the Horn proceeded apace in 1990, as governments lost ground in their efforts to overcome the historical barriers to state formation in the region. The price of their failure was a loss of the means of survival for countless numbers of their citizens and the further weakening of residual foundations for economic development."

The Horn of Africa: From Chaos, Political Renewal?

By John W. Harbeson

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POLITICAL order in the Horn of Africa degenerated further into chaos in 1990, intensifying the desperate economic circumstances of most of the region's citizens. At the same time, international and domestic efforts to mediate the multiple conflicts throughout the region continued, and designs for reconstruction surfaced that included all the warring factions. The central issue for the immediate future in the Horn remained whether and when political and economic reconstruction could reverse the processes of disintegration and destitution.

Despite the difficulty of defining the Horn precisely in geographic or political terms, several distinctive and enduring features help to explain the nature of the crises that have beset the region in recent years. One of these features explains why the region is hard to define: the boundaries of the region are not sharply delineated. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan are usually thought to comprise the Horn of Africa. However, the exclusion of Kenya and Egypt is a matter of judgment, since they have both been actively involved in international politics concerning the other four countries. This judgment is based on the hypothesis that the internal politics of Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sudan have directly and substantially influenced each other, whereas the internal politics of Kenya and Egypt have been insulated from those of the other four.

The boundaries of the Horn's four countries as now defined are also in question. Elsewhere in Africa national boundaries are arbitrary and under dispute, but those in the Horn are particularly unsettled. Somalia has only recently appeared to accept its borders with Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Ethiopian emperors warred with rulers in Sudan over boundaries. Sudan's independence from Egypt was not settled until after World War II; the isolation of southern Sudan is a consequence of colonial rule, not simply a consequence of the policies of the country's postindependence leaders.

The fact that boundaries are more unsettled in the Horn than in Africa as a whole reflects a second defining characteristic of the region: the relatively modest impact of colonial rule. For all its outrages and injustices, colonial rule set up fairly stable political jurisdictions; this, combined with the activities of nationalist movements, instilled at least a rudimentary sense of citizenship and the reality of "national" governments that might serve as a basic foundation for modern statehood. These foundations are even less well established in the region than elsewhere on the continent, precisely because colonial rule was less intensive. Ethiopia was never colonized, except for the brief period of Italian occupation; on the other hand, Eritrea's 75-year history as an Italian colony crystalized that region's separate identity and complicated relations between its peoples and the governments of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie and Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. Colonial regimes were ambivalent about the status of Sudan. By Somali reckoning, competition among four imperial powers — France, Britain, Italy and Ethiopia — frustrated Somali national aspirations and fractured the basis for statehood laid by stable colonial rule elsewhere.

Somalia's experience illustrates a third defining characteristic of the Horn: the "international" politics of the Horn was deeply enmeshed in European politics throughout the colonial period and afterward. Elsewhere on the continent, individual powers eventually established hegemony over constellations of peoples and thereby insulated them from international politics, but in the Horn colonial rivalry and competition continued throughout the colonial era.

These three distinguishing features of the Horn — unsettled identity, the limited political impact of colonial rule, and extended international competition for spheres of influence — contributed to a fourth defining feature. Compared with the limited and often unintentional contributions of colonial rule to development elsewhere in Africa, the direct

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impact of empire on existing socioeconomic structures in the Horn was even more circumscribed. The introduction of new kinds of social stratification, the disruption of precolonial economic patterns and the imposition of Western cultural and economic forms were far less extensive in the Horn than in other parts of Africa. Moreover, colonial rule in the Horn did not provide the preconditions for economic development—infrastructure, education, formalized markets and insertion into the world economy—to the degree that it did elsewhere. The Horn of Africa therefore lacked even alien foundations for postcolonial economic development.

The political disarray and entrenched poverty of the Horn today are thus deeply rooted in distinctive historical political realities that have dictated correspondingly atypical agendas for contemporary Horn governments. Boundary maintenance has been uniquely important to the legitimation of regimes and states, and many precious resources have gone into it. Horn governments have been obliged to establish institutional apparatus for development, whereas other African regimes have "merely" adapted alien institutions to African tastes and realities. Moreover, the countries of the Horn have had to contend with their vulnerability to international influences.

ETHIOPIA: THE POLITICS OF PRAGMATISM

In mid-1990, diplomats and other observers predicted the imminent collapse of Mengistu's 15-year rule in Ethiopia. The armies of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) captured the strategic port of Massawa and successfully resisted several major efforts by the Ethiopian government to retake it. With this victory, the EPLF gained control over the distribution of relief supplies to famine victims, the majority of whom were, for the first time, living in areas dominated by the rebels. EPLF armies laid siege to the town of Asmara, the only obstacle to de facto Eritrean independence, which Eritrean leaders confidently anticipated was but a few months away.

Meanwhile the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allies in neighboring Gondar and Wollo provinces advanced to within 100 miles of the capital, Addis Ababa. While the EPLF and the TPLF controlled most of northern Ethiopia, other liberation movements, notably the Oromo Liberation Front, were at work in the south. In pub-

lic speeches, Mengistu acknowledged for the first time that the country might be dismembered if heroic military efforts were not made.[1]

Wholly preoccupied with multiple civil wars, the Mengistu regime chose to make peace on the domestic front. It abandoned most of the socialist reconstruction programs that were its proclaimed reason for seizing the leadership of the would-be Ethiopian revolution of November, 1974. The regime had undermined both the legitimacy and efficacy of these programs in the eyes of their intended beneficiaries by treating their continued implementation as part of the war effort.

In effect "suing for peace" in March, 1990, the Mengistu government announced that it would henceforth permit private participation in all sectors of the economy and abolish the pre-existing $250,000-limit on private capital investment; grant government-owned land on a concessionary basis to commercial companies for the construction of hotels, industries and other enterprises; allow developers to build homes, apartments and office buildings to rent or sell (the government had held all real estate deeds); require all state-run industries and commercial firms to show a profit or face closure or sale to private interests; and grant small farmers, the backbone of the Ethiopian economy, legal ownership of the land they tilled and the right to sell their produce to private wholesalers and retailers, thus abandoning the government's attempt at near monopolization of grain sales.

These fundamental changes were not followed by detailed plans for the privatization of the economy. This strongly suggested that the Mengistu regime was currying popular favor rather than instituting an about-face in its development policy. The government's failure to provide the details for privatization threatened chaos, particularly in the south, where peasant families took matters into their own hands by reclaiming land in a chaotic fashion.

Mengistu also invited dissident groups to join in national politics. The ruling Workers' party of Ethiopia was to be renamed the Democratic Unity party of Ethiopia "with a broad mandate [to enhance] the democratic rights of all nationalities in the country." Mengistu asked dissident groups to work under the common banner of democracy and national unity. But the important dissident groups were in no mood to negotiate with any government headed by Mengistu and regarded the whole proposal as a sham.

Thus policy changes that seemed to represent a fundamental reorientation failed to take root because they were too little and too late, given the intensity of the fighting in Ethiopia. Policy reform alone would not create a basis for civil peace but must await the achievement of such a peace by

[1]On Eritrea, see Richard Sherman, *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980); on Ethiopia, see Christopher Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), and John W. Harbeson, *The Ethiopian Transformation: The Quest for the Post-Imperial State* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988).

other means. Meanwhile, the fighting seriously hampered relief efforts. The EPLF capture of Massawa left rebel groups, not the government, in the best position to distribute supplies to famine victims. To keep from ceding such an important indicator of sovereignty to the EPLF, the government bombed Massawa.

Against the backdrop of deepening political disintegration and economic catastrophe, there were positive developments. The end of the cold war enabled the Soviet Union and the United States to collaborate in promoting reconciliation among the warring movements in Ethiopia. The Soviet Union notified the Mengistu regime that it would not renew an arms transfer agreement when it expired in 1992. In a pragmatic step, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Tesfai Dinka acknowledged that his country had no "vital conflict of interest with the United States." Recognizing the leading role taken by the United States in mobilizing food aid, Ethiopia moved toward a renewal of closer relations with the United States reminiscent of the postwar era before 1974 — for example, Ethiopia voted with the United States in the United Nations Security Council on the resolutions to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

Changed international circumstances, the end of the cold war and the onset of the Persian Gulf war may have begun to establish some long-awaited preconditions for resolution of the civil wars. The Ethiopian military's success in surviving and counteracting the siege of Asmara, not to mention the failure of the Mengistu regime to follow the predicted timetable for its seemingly inevitable downfall, may also have contributed to an Eritrean disposition to negotiate. The TPLF's adherence to hard-line Marxism–Leninism lent the strength to the Mengistu regime that it would need in any future negotiations. Moreover, Eritrean spokesmen acknowledged publicly for the first time that even an independent Eritrea would need some form of economic association with Ethiopia.

Early in 1991, the United States agreed to act as a broker between the government and the EPLF, perhaps moved in part by renewed recognition of Ethiopia's strategic role as a counterbalance to unfriendly Middle Eastern armies. In this the United States followed the leadership of former President Jimmy Carter, under whose auspices negotiations had been attempted a year earlier. One danger is the possibility that Ethiopia's renewed arms relationship with Israel in exchange for the free emigration of Ethiopian Jews to Israel, may expose delicate internal negotiations to polarized Middle

East politics and as a result undermine them.

THE CIVIL WARS IN SOMALIA

The collapse in January, 1991, of the regime of President Mohammed Siad Barre, who had taken control of the government in a 1969 coup, capped a long period of civil war in which ethnically based rival insurgencies eventually joined to force Siad Barre from office amid economic destruction and waves of human casualties.[2] At this writing, it was unclear whether the cooperating movements would be able to put together a viable successor regime and what kind of regime it would be.

The causes of the civil wars in Somalia are significantly different from those in Ethiopia. The 1977–1978 Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia had failed to extend and escalate the ongoing Ethiopian civil wars and in general had helped to rally support for a beleaguered Mengistu regime. In contrast, in Somalia the Ogaden conflict inspired the civil war that was to topple the regime of President Siad Barre more than a decade later. Discrimination and violence by Siad Barre's regime against ethnic communities other than his own Marehan clan fueled the three main insurgencies. These were the predominantly Issa-Issaq-based Somali National Movement (SNM), the largely Hawiye United Somali Congress (USC) in central Somalia and the heavily Ogadeni-supported Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in the south.

Siad Barre's government appeared rootless and rudderless in 1990. Frequent changes of government personnel and announcements of plans for political reform barely affected the insurgency, while official violence against the rebel movements continued. Siad Barre appointed Mohammed Ali Samantar as Prime Minister in February, 1990, and gave him unprecedented authority to name his own Cabinet. This, together with the new Prime Minister's reputation as a respected general and his roots in a small community not involved in the civil wars, seemed to represent a gesture to the rebels. Siad Barre then promised to legalize the opposition and permit free elections within the year.

Whatever effect these moves might have had in placating the opposition was counterbalanced by the arrest of 50 people who signed a manifesto calling for a conference to promote national reconciliation. The government sought the arrest of more than 100 members of a newly formed Council for National Reconciliation who had circulated the manifesto. In response, Italy, the last Western country to continue to support the Siad Barre regime, threatened to terminate its aid program. The Somali government also miscalculated in arbitrarily raising the price of automobile fuel, initially without allowing increased fares for taxis and

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[2]On Somalia, see David Laitin, *Politics, Language and Thought: Somali Experience* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), and I.M. Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa* (London: Longman Publishers, 1980).

buses, an action that provoked riots in the capital city of Mogadishu.

Siad Barre maneuvered to diffuse the growing opposition to his regime by naming another new Prime Minister, Mohammed Hawadle Madar, an Issaq whose community had supplied most of the troops for the SNM's insurgency. But bomb explosions in Mogadishu greeted this announcement and dramatized the regime's increasing inability to maintain order even in the capital. More than 60 people were killed by police for taunting and throwing stones at Siad Barre during one of his speeches in July.

Triple-digit inflation and an influx of refugees from war-torn rural areas contributed to a general breakdown of law and order. In August the SPM, the USC and the SNM joined forces. A few weeks later Siad Barre's regime essentially admitted its lack of control and was prevented by deepening civil disorder from conducting the scheduled referendum on political reforms it had proposed earlier in 1990.

Significantly, the regime found no major power prepared to support it. The United States acknowledged that neither it nor the Soviet Union had residual cold war interests in Somalia that needed protection; only Libya and the Palestinian terrorist group led by Abu Nidal responded, modestly, to Siad Barre's pleas for assistance. The termination of superpower competition in the region represented an important source of optimism for the political and economic future of Somalia. It diminished the concern that the fall of Siad Barre's regime would create a power vacuum. Conversely, it increased the sense that the major insurgencies might have the time and the power to construct a new and more democratic Somali polity rooted in a common sense of Somali identity.

DIVISIONS IN SUDAN

In 1990, Sudan experienced a deepening and seemingly irreconcilable division between the largely Muslim and Arabic-speaking north and the southern part of the country.[3] The regime of Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir, which had come to power by overthrowing the government of Prime Minister Sadig Mohdi in June, 1989, appeared to edge closer to a fully Islamic state, and further alienated the south because of its alliance with the National Islamic Front. In an attempt at reconciliation, the Bashir regime offered to suspend the implementation of Islamic law and establish a federal state. The

guerrilla Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which is based in the south, dismissed the offers, regarding them as disguises for continued repression. The SPLA, led by John Garang, increased pressure on the regime by placing the key city of Juba under siege for much of 1990 and by extending the area it controlled.

The civil war tore the underlying fabric of Sudanese society, disrupting the already marginal livelihoods of an increasing number of people, particularly those in the south, forcing their migration, and sparking clashes between Christians and Muslims. These events magnified the effects of the famine that gripped Sudan. The relief agencies and the people they attempted to aid were caught between the warring armies. In Juba, for example, the SPLA urged all 200,000 residents to evacuate to clear the way for its assault on the city, while the Bashir government attacked those who sought to leave, evidently using them as human shields against SPLA attacks.

The Bashir regime remained insecure in its northern base, the target of two attempted coups and perhaps of collaboration between the SPLA and an urban opposition fueled by the government's failure to end the war and its brutal repression of all opposition. Bashir's foreign policy seemed simultaneously to establish and undermine the bases for reconciliation. Both Garang and Bashir responded positively to a Zairean offer of mediation, but at the same time Bashir took steps toward integration with Libya, a move that was not calculated to reassure the south.

THE HORN'S POLITICAL DISINTEGRATION

The political disintegration of the Horn proceeded apace in 1990, as governments lost ground in their efforts to overcome the historical barriers to state formation in the region. The price of their failure was a loss of the means of survival for countless numbers of their citizens and the further weakening of the residual foundations for economic development.

The end of the cold war was the best news the Horn had in 1990, yet the possibility remained that the activities of regional powers like Libya and Israel might intensify conflict in the region. However, the end of superpower competition created an important precondition for the formation of a new and more stable regime in Somalia. Willingness by the United States and the Soviet Union to cooperate to promote peace may yet bear fruit in Ethiopia. ∎

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[3] A useful introduction to Sudanese politics is P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, *The History of Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1979).

John W. Harbeson is the author of *The Ethiopian Transformation: The Quest for the Post-Imperial State* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988).

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

THINKING ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA: REA-
SON, MORALITY AND POLITICS. *Edited by
Peter Collins.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.
205 pages, notes, bibliographies and index,
$35.00.)

The philosophers, political scientists, psycholo-
gist and former diplomat who contributed the eight
essays in this collection critically examine South
Africa's past and future. This is a rigorously intel-
lectual book, not intended to keep up with events or
with fluctuations in the international attitude
toward South Africa.

The moral philosopher M.A. Hare and Peter
Collins of the University of Cape Town, the editor
of this volume and a translator of Emile Durkheim,
provide utilitarian critiques of the evils of apartheid
and suggest possible directions for change within
South Africa. Peter du Preez offers a case study of
the National party and a psychological model of
"the politics of rationally contrived disaster"—deci-
sions that appear rational in the short term between
elections may ultimately prove self-defeating.

R.W. Johnson, the author of the seminal 1977
book, *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* looks back
on the missed opportunities for reform in the 1980's
and looks forward with some apprehension to a
troubled South African political scene that will be "a
sea in which many fish can swim," most of the large
ones predators. In a version of an article that first
appeared in 1985 in *The Atlantic,* Conor Cruise
O'Brien recounts the experience of journeying to a
church in Soweto and hearing Bishop Desmond
Tutu preach. He describes, with horror for the act
and some understanding of the rage behind it, the
"necklaces," or gasoline-filled rubber tires, hung
around the necks of alleged black collaborators and
then set alight by ghetto youths.

Alice H.G. Phillips

HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CUL-
TURAL PERSPECTIVES. *Edited by Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Na'im and Francis M. Deng.* (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990. 399 pages,
notes, bibliographies and index, $36.95, cloth;
$16.95, paper.)

Francis Deng, a former minister of state for for-
eign affairs in Sudan, and Abdullahi Ahmed An-
Na'im, a law professor at Khartoum University
now at the University of Saskatchewan, have
gathered in this lengthy volume 13 essays on hu-

man rights, most of which were originally
presented at a workshop in June, 1988.

By looking at religious beliefs and ethical practice
among the Dinka of Sudan, the Akan of Ghana
and Ivory Coast, and the Muslims of North Africa,
for example, the book aims to show that human
rights is not an exclusively Western concept. The
editors argue that rulers of third world countries
who subvert these rights on the grounds of the con-
cept's "cultural impurity" or "colonialist taint" are
particularly cynical oppressors.   A.P.

THE ECONOMICS OF APARTHEID. *By Stephen
R. Lewis.* (New York: Council on Foreign Rela-
tions Press, 1990. 196 pages, tables, maps, appen-
dix, suggested readings and index, $17.95, paper.)

The dismantling of apartheid continues in South
Africa, but the most serious obstacle to peaceful
change once apartheid ends is not political but eco-
nomic—and it has yet to be addressed by the South
African government. *The Economics of Apartheid* suc-
cinctly analyzes the effects of apartheid on the de-
velopment of the South African economy, examin-
ing the unequal income distribution between blacks
and whites, South Africa's role in regional and in-
ternational economies and, most important, the in-
terrelationship between economic and political
change in South Africa.

Lewis notes that South Africa, its free-market
rhetoric aside, has one of the world's most decidedly
statist economies (the public sector controls and
regulates a significant portion of the economy).
This alone means that the choice for a postapart-
heid government will not be simply continuing the
free market (since it does not exist) or adopting the
socialist model advocated by African National
Congress deputy president Nelson Mandela.

Lewis's book is a helpful primer on the focal issue
in South Africa's future after apartheid; neither
dogmatic nor dry, it offers a lucid view of a some-
times obscure area of debate.

William W. Finan, Jr.

WALVIS BAY: DECOLONIZATION AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW. *By Lynn Berat.* (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. 219 pages,
maps, chronology and index, $25.00.)

This is a readable if densely detailed examina-
tion of South Africa's claim to Walvis Bay, Na-
mibia's only deep-water port. The emphasis is on
international law as it has evolved and been applied
to Namibia and Walvis Bay.   W.W.F. ■

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MOZAMBIQUE
(Continued from page 220)

South African firms are overhauling the port of Maputo to facilitate exports from the Transvaal. A South African hotel group, Karos Hotels, has formed a joint venture with the Mozambican government for a $12-million project to refurbish the glorious old Polana Hotel. Zimbabwean investors have agreed to renovate two hotels that are located in Beira.

With an economy so dependent on outside assistance, the Mozambican government has no choice but to continue to court aid by implementing new economic programs. Improving the nontraditional export sector of the economy and increasing foreign investment will take time and, above all, peace. ■

NAMIBIA
(Continued from page 216)

ligence. Just before the 1989 election, the Namibian Supreme Court ordered him to produce five SWAPO-held detainees. The death, detention and torture of hundreds of its own members accused of spying for South Africa still haunt SWAPO.

Many observers feel that Hawala's appointment marks a shift in the balance between the hard-line faction and the moderates or pragmatists within SWAPO. Hard-liners maintain that if former personnel from the SWATF and Koevoet (a notoriously ruthless police unit) can be promoted in the armed forces, why not General Hawala? Hawala was appointed in unscheduled "emergency" SWAPO central committee and politburo meetings that were held while leading moderates were out of town. Nonetheless, Hawala was approved by the Cabinet the following day; President Nujoma himself introduced the appointment. Some see the "Stalinists"—those in national intelligence and the security forces—as positioned to assert themselves should SWAPO lose power in the 1991 local elections or should the party fear losses in future national elections.

DEVELOPING THE ECONOMY

The government's economic performance has done little to strengthen its popularity in non-Ovambo regions. The economy is not especially weak, but expectations were high at independence and little seems to have been done to address the fundamental structural weaknesses that were South Africa's legacy to Namibia. Many had assumed before independence that a government chosen by the majority would benefit from an end to sanctions, an immediate injection of foreign economic assistance and new private investment. Such windfalls have not materialized.

South Africa left Namibia with several pressing economic problems, besides the fundamental inequities built into the system. Namibia inherited a budget deficit of $200 million from the territorial administration, and Pretoria terminated direct subsidies, estimated to have ranged between $125 million and $200 million a year. The SWAPO government tried to rectify these problems, but a UN-sponsored donors' conference in June, 1990, produced pledges of only $200 million toward the first year's reconstruction and development program. Pledges also provide for $150 million a year from 1991 to 1993.

Trade and commodities difficulties compound the economic problems Namibia faces. Although the mining sector is sound—mining accounts for 40 percent of Namibia's gross domestic product (GDP) and 85 percent of its exports—some mining operations have been forced to close down. Uranium, the main source of foreign exchange earnings, is in oversupply on world markets and production has been cut. A major uranium oxide contract signed with France by the Rossing Uranium Mining Company in August, 1990, does not begin until 1995. Diamond supplies are starting to dwindle, and it is estimated that by 1996 coastal mines will be exhausted. The seabed may be a potential source of supply.

Other economic sectors are also hurting. A long drought has depressed agricultural sales and the quality of the wool and meat produced; moreover, the South African market for Namibian meat has been shrinking. Employment has fallen in construction. Manufacturing is weak, despite talk of a new Citroën automobile assembly plant in Tsumeb, a new oil refinery in Lonrho, and new brewing and bottling facilities. The Southern African Development Coordinating Conference has approved several projects for Namibia, but these are largely aimed at the country's infrastructure and will take time to be realized.

Since independence Namibia has sought to protect its fishing waters by enforcing its claim to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive maritime economic zone. Before independence the boundary was ignored because foreign states did not recognize Pretoria's right to govern Namibia. Soviet, Spanish and South African companies had done most of the fishing, and the bulk of the processing took place in Walvis Bay factories, most of which are partly or wholly owned by South African firms. Now Namibia is in a position to control concessionary rights to fishing waters, as well as to determine the total allowable catch. At independence, the government asked foreign fleets to halt fishing in coastal waters until stocks had been assessed. Overfishing in the 1970's and 1980's had badly depleted the

waters, but the area is making a stronger than expected comeback. Once a fishing policy is established, small gains can be expected.

The dispute over Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep-water port, still troubles its relations with South Africa.[9] UN Security Council Resolution 432 recognizes Namibia's ownership of the port, and the new constitution recognizes Walvis Bay as part of Namibia. Yet Pretoria continues to hold the port and the surrounding area and maintains a heavy military presence in the enclave. There may be negotiations for transfer of the territory, but meanwhile South Africa has a firm grip on the port.

The Namibian economy remains skewed toward white and especially South African interests. The annual per capita income of more than $1,000 is one of the highest in Africa, but most blacks are subsistence farmers. Whites have an average annual income of $16,000, while the average for black Namibians is less than $100 a year. It follows that land, wealth and skills are inordinately concentrated in minority hands.

NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Many tout Namibia as a "dry run" for South Africa in its transition to majority rule. Both countries are racially diverse, but South Africa's population is 34 million, while Namibia's is about 1.5 million. Where South Africa's GDP is about 237 billion rand, Namibia's is only 3.5 billion rand. Still, white South Africans are looking to Namibia for some hints on how an apartheid society might make the transition to democracy while retaining the good life for its minority population. From their perspective, Namibia looks good so far. But for ordinary Namibians who are struggling to survive, Namibia under SWAPO rule has not yet provided answers.

The timing of independence, coming in the wake of the breakup of the Socialist regimes in East Europe and changes in the Soviet Union, is unfortunate. Namibia must compete for resources at a time when other needs appear more critical to the leaders of the capitalist world. Thus after a reasonably positive start Namibia could falter because of conditions far beyond its political influence.   ∎

[9]See Lynn Barat, *Walvis Bay: Decolonization and International Law* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

THE POLITICS OF DISSENT IN KENYA
(Continued from page 208)

in December, 1986. A sensational contest over his remains ensued. Otieno's wife, Wambui Waiyaki Otieno, became the center of a storm about customary law, women's rights and intertribal marriages

when the Umira Kager clan took her to court to block her plans to bury him. According to Wambui and her witnesses, Otieno had asked to be buried near the Nairobi home where he had lived his married and professional life and raised 15 children. A series of court cases that concluded in May, 1987, with a Court of Appeal ruling, awarded the custody of Otieno's remains to his clansmen for burial in his birthplace in western Kenya, according to Luo custom.

Wambui's lawyers argued that Otieno had, through his choices of partner, Christian beliefs, lifestyle and residence, forsaken "tribal" custom for a modern life and that customary Luo burial law therefore had no jurisdiction in his case; rather, Kenya's common law applied. Otieno's clan asserted that, on the contrary, Otieno's birth and upbringing as a Luo were paramount. Kenyan legal statutes do not spell out clearly which legal system takes precedence in a clash between common and customary law; the courts — with the tacit approval of the government — chose to rule on the side of "custom" as defined by the clansmen. Their decisions set back women's rights and the development of a national, progressive jurisprudence in Kenya, while fanning the country's ethnic tensions. The funeral in the clan's district was treated as a triumphant homecoming and a vindication of Luo culture and values. Wambui refused to attend the ceremony as custom required of widows; Otieno was thus, ironically, buried as an unmarried man. Wambui called a press conference after the final appeal court ruling to announce that she would have no more to do with the clan, and henceforth would be known by her father's name.[11]

The burial saga revealed some important things about the nature of state and society in Kenya. It showed that "custom" and "tradition," far from being timeless concepts from the precolonial past, are potent inventions of the present, constructed to serve political interests. The case also revealed that the contemporary African state and subnational structures like clans and lineages have an economic and political interest in controlling women.

Although Wambui lost custody of her husband's body and was vilified by national politicians, the press and judges, she showed that Kenyan women could resist the control of their marital lineage and use the courts to do so. Wambui thus opened the political arena for future feminist struggle against the coercive power of social institutions and the state. Her predicament also politicized the Kikuyu, even though there was no public upwelling of support for her. The ridicule heaped on the Kikuyu in the courts and the media reminded the formerly dominant group of its diminished status and gave its dissatisfaction a focus.

[11]Wambui had already refused to marry Otieno's brother, according to the Luo practice of levirate marriage.

Finally, the case exposed the terms of the negotiations about what kind of society Kenya should be. The good Kenyan citizen, promoted in political discourse between independence and the 1980's, was the progressive individual who transcended "tribalism." Otieno, as presented by Wambui and her lawyer, was precisely such a citizen, a man who "lived and died as a Kenyan rather than as a Luo." The new model of the male citizen that emerged from this case is a man who juggles progress with tradition, but who fulfills his responsibility to the "tribe of his father" above all. Ironically, to be a nationalist patriot today is, in a way, to be a dissident, in spite of the endless government rhetoric condemning "tribal chauvinism."

THE FIGHT TO KEEP NAIROBI GREEN

In Moi's Kenya, defending the environment can also become an act of political defiance. In 1989 the government announced plans for the building of a massive media complex in Nairobi's downtown Uhuru Park. The buildings were intended to become headquarters for the government's Kenya Times Media Trust and were to be wholly owned by KANU. Enthusiastic government and party supporters claimed the 60-story office tower and two flanking 10-story wings would be "the most magnificent and prestigious building in Africa." A four-story statue of President Moi was to stand in front of the complex.

Financing was to be provided by a consortium of British and United States banks; the estimated cost was 4.3 billion shillings (approximately $200 million), or seven percent of Kenya's national budget. In October, 1989, the Architectural Association of Kenya complained to the ministry of lands, housing and physical planning that "200-meter-high concrete monoliths, generating a dynamic population of several thousand people . . . will change Uhuru Park beyond recognition and [cause] a complete loss of the greenbelt." Concerns were also expressed that the project would cause a serious escalation of Kenya's $4-billion foreign debt and deflect the government from its inflation and budget deficit targets, on which International Monetary Fund lending was predicated.

None of these critics was prepared to mount a full-scale challenge to the grandiose project, however. That task was left to the feminist gadfly Wangari Maathai, a former professor of veterinary anatomy and the leader of Kenya's Greenbelt Movement, an internationally acclaimed organization promoting tree-planting and environmental awareness in Kenya. In late November, 1989, after the Vice President presented a paper outlining the

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[12]*Globe and Mail* (Toronto), December 27, 1989, p. 1.

building project to Parliament, Maathai filed suit in the High Court seeking a permanent injunction against its construction.

Claiming that KANU and the Kenya Times Trust had violated Kenyan law and Nairobi's official development plan, she castigated the government and KANU for ignoring both environmental concerns and the needs of Nairobi's urban poor, for whom the park was the sole means of recreation. She contended that "KANU, with a membership of only 4 million out of more than 20 million Kenyans, is endeavoring to enforce the construction of the complex against the constitution and without the consent of the majority of Kenyans." Her appeal struck a chord among Nairobi residents, as the flood of letters to newspapers attested. "I beg you, our leaders: you already have a lot of what you want—cars, homes, offices. Please allow us only this," wrote one.[12]

The court refused on a technicality to listen to Maathai's suit, and the President responded contemptuously to her challenge, claiming that opponents to the project "have insects in their heads." When he wondered why women's groups in Kenya had not ostracized their "wayward" colleague, several branches of the party-controlled Maendeleo ya Wanawake umbrella organization staged demonstrations against Maathai, led by police officers.

Interestingly, although a chorus of women leaders called for her expulsion from the party, the demonstrators burned their anti-Maathai placards after the demonstrations, suggesting a divergence between the party line and the women's actual sentiments toward her. During the next two months, Maathai and her organization suffered constant harassment. In mid-December the Greenbelt Movement was ordered to quit within 24 hours the headquarters it had occupied for 10 years. Several MP's called for the deregistration of the organization, and in January, 1990, the government's registrar general began an audit of the movement's accounts.

Maathai responded to the harassment by saying that "it ought to be possible for an individual to raise any issues on matters of public interest and even in international courts to protect mankind on issues concerning the environment." She reiterated her position that Uhuru Park was a national monument of "utmost political, religious and cultural value," and warned that local hostility to Greenbelt employees over the issue was threatening the tree-planting program. Several rural women depended on tree-planting income for their livelihood, she said, but

the majority of the people in the movement are poor, they are not reading the newspapers. . . . They hear

this secondhand, that the movement is subversive. Then they are scared. They don't want to be seen as against the government, which can lead you into a lot of trouble.[13]

Maathai's crusade, like Wambui's ordeal, was an important moment in Kenya's politics of dissent. She effectively raised the issue of freedom of speech, and she succeeded in putting the environment on the political agenda. For all their bluster, the regime and KANU were sent into retreat on the project. As a result of the furor (aided no doubt by Maathai's growing international stature as an environmental hero), the United States, Britain, Japan, the European Community and the World Bank put pressure on the Kenyan government to scale back the project; as a consequence, plans for the huge office complex and skyscraper were scrapped; instead, a conference center and hotel costing $70 million will be built on the site.

WE, THE PEOPLE

On January 13, 1991, Oginga Odinga, an old leftist Luo warhorse, announced the formation of a new National Democratic party, whose immediate purpose was to repeal the 1982 constitutional provision for a one-party state. A Vice President under Kenyatta, Odinga broke with KANU in 1966 to lead the opposition Kenya People's Union (KPU). Gadfly to both Kenyatta and Moi, Odinga has moved in and out of political limbo several times since the KPU was banned in 1969. While his son Raila Odinga is treated as a serious dissident and was jailed for much of the 1980's, Oginga Odinga is treated as somewhat of a joke. When he sprang to Wambui Otieno's defense during the burial affair, chastising his fellow Luo for their ethnic and sexist chauvinism, the Umira Kager clan lawyer ridiculed him as "a disgraced and slow-punctured politician." The *Weekly Review* cast him as an octogenarian Don Quixote, desperate to make a last political mark with a gesture that was "doomed to fail."

With the events of 1990, however, Odinga sounds more like the conscience of a nation swept up in what Africans are calling "the second wind of change" (the first having been the independence movement). The African Charter on People's Participation, drafted in Arusha, Tanzania, in February, 1990, set the tone for a new African political dispensation. Odinga's justification for his new initiative is very much in keeping with these continent-wide aspirations. "Without multiparty democracy, there will be no accountability in government, corruption will destroy the fabric of socie-

ty, the economy will continue to be mismanaged, and the ordinary citizen will continue to suffer." What people want, he said, is "a government of their choice, pursuing policies of national development, and not individual self-aggrandizement."

Odinga's life and ideas are a microcosm of the ebb and flow in Kenyan politics. Neither a liberal democracy nor a repressive dictatorship, Kenya is a society under constant negotiation and revision. "The Kenya We Want," the title of a 1963 independence manifesto, is a phrase that resurfaces again and again in popular discourse, voicing a question that is never fully answered. In Kenya's political, social and cultural arenas, every struggle for a more open and just society joins with other struggles to create a radical democratic politics searching for the Kenya its citizens want. ∎

NIGERIA

first in the period of military rule — and the minister of defense, General Domkat Bali (the most senior general in the country), left the government after refusing a demotion to the Ministry of Interior. Many other changes were made, both in strategic military commands and in the Cabinet.

The reshuffle generated intense controversy for two reasons. First, it tended to confirm fears of incipient dictatorship. General Bali declared that "the supremacy . . . which ought to be with the AFRC has been usurped substantially by the presidency. . . . My fear is that it is becoming more a dictatorship of a person."[10] In a speech in Liberia widely believed to be a message not only to Liberian President Samuel K. Doe but to Babangida as well, retired General T. Y. Danjuma, the esteemed army chief of staff during the previous transition, denounced authoritarian "sit-tight leaders" in Africa who have sentenced their citizenries to "life imprisonment"; he "implored military rulers currently in the process of disengagement to get rid of the foolish thought that the military is indispensable in government."[11]

Second, many Nigerian Christians were critical of the reorganization, partly because it left all four of the armed services with Muslim commanders, three of them from the north. Organized political protest by Christians had surfaced early in 1986 after the regime appeared to have surreptitiously taken the country into full membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference; the Christian

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[13]Interview with Jane Perlez, *The New York Times,* December 6, 1989.

[10]Public interviews on January 9 and 10, excerpted in *Newswatch,* January 22, 1990, p. 15. .

[11]*African Concord,* April 30, 1990, p. 22. General Danjuma subsequently confirmed in an interview published in the same issue and conducted just days before the April 22 coup that he "had Nigeria in mind," when he made these remarks, p. 26.

Association of Nigeria charged that this threatened to violate Nigeria's secular status and to legitimize a Muslim monopoly on strategic government positions.[12] The February, 1990, government reshuffle aggravated this Christian anxiety, which was deepened further by the December reshuffle. After the December 29 Cabinet changes, Christians demonstrated in four states and the Christian Association of Nigeria charged that the government was no longer maintaining religious balance but was covertly and overtly favoring Islam.

An attempted military coup staged by Christians, mainly from the minority southern states, took place in the early morning hours of April 22, 1990. Seizing the government radio station, the rebels then bombarded Dodan Barracks for seven hours in an intense barrage that wrecked the presidential compound and narrowly missed killing the President. Fortunately for Nigeria, the coup—which was apparently well financed if amateurishly executed—did not succeed. The rebels broadcast a statement of their grievances on the national airwaves—a furious indictment of Babangida and his regime. The rebels decried the signs of Babangida's "desire to become a President for life"—his recent Cabinet reshuffle, his manipulation of the transition program, his personal rule of the Defense Ministry, the SSS and the prospective National Guard. The rebels also criticized "the internal colonization of the Nigerian state by the so-called chosen few" (read northern Muslims).[13]

The coup attempt resonated with widespread grievances and, in its pledges to reconstitute the government, purge corruption and "recover all ill-gotten wealth," advanced a populist and potentially popular agenda. Indeed, there were some reports of celebrations in the south as news of the coup spread. But most Nigerians are disgusted with coups, and if the misguided coup-makers, who declared they were temporarily expelling the five northern Muslim states, had prevailed, even temporarily, the country would almost certainly have been derailed in its progress toward democracy and plunged again into civil war.

THE RESURRECTION OF POLITICS

The immediate effects of the coup attempt were to harden the dictatorship and trigger an unprecedented wave of political repression. Hundreds of military and civilian suspects were arrested and de-

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[12]Rotimi T. Suberu, "Religion and Politics in the Transition: A View from the South" (Paper presented to the Conference on Democratic Transition and Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, January 9–12, 1991).

[13]Broadcast statement of coup spokesman Major Gideon Okra, *Newswatch,* May 7, 1990, p. 37.

[14]Suberu, op. cit., p. 29.

tained, including more than a dozen journalists and several prominent scholars and government critics. In July, 42 soldiers were executed after secret trials, and in September another 27 were executed. In retrospect, however, the coup attempt appears to have lanced a terrible boil of political frustrations. By the summer of 1990, the country had begun to return to the politics of transition.

During the three months following the coup, politicians fought their way to power in the two government-created parties through caucuses and meetings that culminated in national conventions in Abuja in July. There national party officers were elected to replace the government's temporary administrators. This process produced revised party constitutions and manifestos and a clearer sense of the personalities and alliances that will probably shape the Third Republic.

As expected, the National Republican Convention (the party "a little to the right") strongly reproduces the ruling National party of Nigeria coalition of the Second Republic; many barons of that powerful political machine were active behind the scenes in Abuja. Also as expected, political elites from the northern regional base of that party triumphed by electing as national chairman a southerner from Bendel state, Tom Ikimi. This paves the way for the NRC to nominate a northerner for President in 1992, given the provisions in the constitution that each party must "zone" different offices and nominations to distribute broadly the political rewards among all ethnic and regional groups. By contrast, the Social Democratic party (the party "a little to the left") nominated a northern Muslim, Baba Gana Kingibe, as its national chairman, signaling the prospect of a southern presidential candidate. For some, this heightened fears that the two-party system would divide the country between north and south, and between Muslim and Christian.

There is a potential for bitter religious and ethnic conflict in Nigerian politics, but there are also strong reasons for believing that neither of these will destroy the Third Republic. First, whatever their other faults, politicians have always proved more adept at "the mediation and moderation of religious and regional cleavages by competitive political bargaining" than have military rulers; the lack of "a mediatory political process" may help to explain why religious conflict has become more serious under military rule, and indeed why the descent into a bloody ethnic civil war occurred once (and almost a second time) under military rule.[14]

Second, both parties represent truly broad, multiethnic, multireligious alliances. To a considerable extent, they reproduce a cross-cutting alliance that was apparent during the First Republic. Then,

southern progressives joined forces with Muslim radicals and several ethnic minorities from the north in a United Progressive Grand Alliance against the ruling Northern People's Congress. Although dominated by conservative northern elites, this alliance also drew support from southern and some northern ethnic minorities. The alliance reemerged during the Second Republic in the broad opposition Progressive Parties Alliance that vigorously challenged the ruling National party of Nigeria. The results of the December 8, 1990, local government elections also show considerable historical continuity in the bases for party support.

If the local elections are any guide to the future, however, there may also be some important and historic surprises in store. For the first time since independence, the more southern-based and progressive Social Democratic party emerged from nationwide elections with a clear majority, winning in this case a majority of local government councillors in 14 of the 21 states. Should this pattern hold in subsequent elections, the government of the Third Republic could be headed by a southerner, for the first time under civilian rule in Nigeria and for only the second time of any real duration in the country's history. Whichever party wins the presidency, the country may emerge with a party system more balanced and cross-cutting ethnically than ever before.

PROSPECTS FOR THE THIRD REPUBLIC

These are hopeful and exciting trends, but many Nigerians believe they are also beside the point. The character of politics shows little sign of change. Rumors, charges and news reports of extensive bribery, vote-buying and fraud have dogged the political process from the 1987 voter registration exercise (in which more than 70 million certificates were handed out in a country with probably no more than 55 million people of voting age) through the 1989 competition for party registration to the successive party caucuses and conventions in 1990.[15] Although the December, 1990, elections proceeded with unusual efficiency and tranquility, the use of a controversial open ballot and the fear of violence lowered voter turnout to about 15 percent, and election tribunals were flooded with petitions from losing candidates claiming electoral irregularities.

The problems are plain and profound. The primary motive for pursuing public office in Nigeria remains the opportunity for accumulating fabulous

ill-gotten fortunes and for dispensing favors to supporters. This can be changed only if corrupt public officers, elected and appointed, are exposed, tried and seriously punished in large numbers. Although the institutional machinery from the 1979 constitution for doing this has been strengthened in the new constitution, and the machinery has been activated this time well in advance of civilian rule, investigators' powers remain inadequate, and they have so far failed to punish a single public official for misconduct in office.[16]

If a democratic regime is to survive in Nigeria, it must prove that it can govern effectively. This will require more than combating corruption, more than conducting credible elections, more than "reflecting the federal character" in the distribution of power and rewards and managing religious and ethnic cleavages. All these are essential, but so is effective economic performance. Civilian politicians must show that they can direct the economy competently and begin to produce not merely economic growth but growth that expands opportunities and improves living conditions for the urban and rural poor.

Competent economic management requires more than accountability and social justice. Sustainable and broadly distributed economic growth will not be possible unless Nigeria reduces its extraordinary dependence on oil income, imported goods and state employment, while increasing agricultural production, private investment and entrepreneurship, industrial production and production of components used in domestic industry, and non-oil exports. All this requires continued structural adjustment. However, the Babangida regime—despite a steadfast commitment to SAP that has won it the admiration of the World Bank and the IMF—has failed to develop a broad domestic constituency for SAP. Instead, the regime has stigmatized the whole approach by associating it in the public mind with repression and corruption. As a result, the incoming civilian regime will be under intense pressure to retreat from or even abandon the program.

Nigeria's third quest for democracy will have the advantages of an increasingly resourceful and independent civil society, a strong cultural commitment to liberty and widespread disillusionment with the military as an answer to the country's problems. If the country can make its institutions of accountability work this time; if it can elect a leadership with a real commitment to the public good; and if that leadership can craft a political coalition for a revised but continuing structural adjustment, Nigeria will have a real chance to fulfill Ibrahim Babangida's wish that his military coup will be the last in Nigeria's history. ∎

[15]Eme Awa, "Elections and Electoral Administration in the Transition" (Paper presented to the Conference on Democratic Transition, Hoover Institution, August 22-29, 1990), pp. 16-18.

[16]On the challenge of combating corruption, see Larry Diamond, *Journal of Democracy,* vol. 2, no. 4 (Autumn, 1991).

SOUTH AFRICAN MYTHS

doctrine, despite the collapse of communism in East Europe, and many of its members hold top positions in the ANC. But ANC stalwarts are beginning to express reservations about discredited foreign ideologies and to question the sincerity of the Communist party's sudden conversion to democracy; they are openly exploring a range of economic options, including socialism and free enterprise, to address a post-apartheid agenda.

The Communist party's visibility at ANC rallies has been scaled back, compared with the days after Mandela's release, when leading Communist party members hovered at Mandela's side and Communist flags and emblems were at times more conspicuous than those of the ANC. Operationally, the two parties are quite different in character. While the ANC is striving to establish itself as an open, heterogeneous, mass political association, the Communist party remains a secretive, disciplined elite of true believers.

But the myth of the ANC's dominance is perhaps best exposed by the organizational difficulties the ANC has encountered since it was legalized. In key areas it has fallen short of achieving its own stated goals. It had hoped to sign up 1 million members by the end of 1990, but had registered only 300,000 by then. It expected to raise enormous sums through Mandela's international trips, but a financial crisis looms. It anticipated having its branch organizations operational in a few months, but most decisions are made by a small group of senior leaders clustered in Johannesburg. Moreover, the organization lacks the telephones, facsimile machines, transportation, office space and staff to deal with surging demands.

"Everybody wants something from the ANC," one observer commented. "There are enormous expectations of it, expectations which the ANC has done nothing to discourage, of course, because that would be politically very stupid."[8] As a result, the ANC must share responsibilities with and defer to the initiatives of many allied or autonomous associations, including labor, civic organizations, youth groups and educational leaders. This dispersal of power is planting the seeds of pluralism, not one-party domination.

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[8]Paul Bell, "Stretched to the Limit," *Leadership*, September, 1990, pp. 21–26, quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Sub-Saharan Africa Daily Report*, October 30, 1990, p. 6.

[9]The UDF is an umbrella organization of some 600 associations supportive of the ANC that was formed in 1983 to protest the tricameral constitution; in March, 1991, the UDF announced that it would disband because it had achieved its larger political goals.

As the leading anti-apartheid organization, the ANC will adopt a maximalist negotiating strategy: it will represent a broad anti-apartheid front, approach talks as one of only two sides, and address the entire post-apartheid agenda. The ANC initially had high expectations of mobilizing support around its newly freed leadership, which would act as the vanguard of the anti-apartheid movement. But within months its maximalist strategy evaporated. The ANC faced stiff opposition from the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom party led by Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi on the right, and the Pan-Africanist Congress and other Africanist-oriented parties on the left. The contest for supremacy within the black community, particularly between the ANC and Inkatha, has been violent. More than 3,500 people were killed in political unrest in 1990, shocking the ANC and others into the realization that cooperation among black organizations could not be taken for granted.

Nor is the ANC able to tackle the entire agenda of issues requiring negotiation with the government. Before the government lifted the ban on the ANC, the anti-apartheid struggle had spawned several strong-minded groups that have now staked out their own political ground. They have entered negotiations with the government on many important issues, often without the ANC's formal participation. For example, some members of the United Democratic Front (UDF) have invested their energies in civic associations and other local pressure groups dealing with housing, rent boycotts, education and urban services, thus breaking down traditional barriers against popular participation before constitutional negotiations formally begin.[9]

Trade unions, particularly the powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions, which is also allied with the ANC, have been successfully negotiating with the government. A Labor Relations Amendment Bill introduced in Parliament in 1991 has been termed South Africa's "first post-apartheid statute." Community organizations have been pressuring Pretoria to restructure local government, a goal that received a substantial boost when de Klerk stated in a February, 1991, speech that he would accept the "one municipality, one tax base" concept placing segregated communities like Johannesburg and Soweto under one nonracial metropolitan government.

Finally, the ANC has accepted the idea of a multiparty conference, publicly proposed by Mandela in his ANC anniversary message on January 8, 1991. As the ANC described the conference, it

would set out principles for framing a new constitution, determine the composition of a drafting body, such as a constitutional assembly, and establish an in-

terim government to replace white minority rule until a new government was democratically elected.[10]

This proposal, endorsed by Pretoria and Inkatha, broke a stalemate that had existed since exploratory talks between the ANC and the government began in May, 1990. Adopting a tone that reflected an adjustment in strategy, Mandela said that "it would be a mistake for the ANC or the government to think that they are the only parties who must be involved in the negotiating process. We are major parties, but we are not the only actors."[11]

The homelands and other political groups linked to the South African government, like the parties participating in the Coloured (mixed-race) and Indian houses of Parliament, will not play a significant role. As creatures of apartheid, they have no legitimacy. Previously shunned because they were regarded as puppets of the regime, homeland leaders are now actively courted by the ANC. Many have shifted their sympathy, if not their outright support, to the ANC, a windfall that the ANC has warmly welcomed. However, a few, the most prominent of whom is KwaZulu's Chief Buthelezi, remain beyond reach. While the meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi in January, 1991, may indicate that Buthelezi is willing to cooperate on the problem of violence, he is not ready to relinquish his claim as the foremost black opponent of the ANC.

In fact, the political allegiance of several constituencies that are not under the ANC's umbrella may be in flux. These constituencies include Coloureds, Asians, the rural population, black entrepreneurs, evangelical groups and blacks on the government payroll who remain unsure about the ANC's political primacy. After the ANC consultative conference in December, 1990, an ANC press statement acknowledged that "we are painfully aware of our continued failure to give due . . . attention and resources to the organizing of our rural people and their struggles."[12] Ethnic, rural-based constituencies, including the homelands, may represent between one-third and one-half the electorate; they are likely to be wooed by several parties, including whites seeking political pacts with blacks as elections approach. While unlikely to challenge the predominant role of the ANC, alliances across the color line would add elements of unpredictability and pluralism to a burgeoning democracy.

MYTHS ABOUT POLITICAL CHANGE

Myths about whites and blacks clouded every-

[10] *The New York Times,* January 9, 1991.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Press statement from the African National Congress, December 16, 1990, p. 3.

one's vision; they prevented South Africans from learning about the world and, conversely, created misconceptions, half-truths and distortions that skewed international perceptions of South Africa. These led to grave miscalculations about the nature of political change, the question that generated the greatest myths of all. Conventional wisdom argued that the conflict in South Africa was, and would likely remain, utterly unique; that, for all its complexities, South African society was fundamentally and unalterably divided between black and white; that blacks were committed to "seizing" power through force; and that whites, however enlightened, would at best grant peripheral and piecemeal concessions that would not result in any significant structural change.

South Africa, however, is conforming neither to the Armageddon nor to the Napoleonic models of change. Its uniqueness is gradually yielding to the commonplace, that is, to conflicts and dilemmas evidenced in democratic experiments by plural societies everywhere. As in East Europe, democracy and economic transformation are proceeding hand in hand, with uncertain results for both. As in the Soviet Union, in South Africa the *nomenklatura,* or patronage apparatus, is emerging as one of the principal obstacles to change, and ethnic nationalism and class conflict are increasing as tyranny recedes. Like Germany, South Africa must integrate an artificially divided society, deciding what to do about land, employment, education, neighborhoods, security structures and uneven development. And as was true in the United States after the Civil War, in South Africa people of different races are learning that freedom does not automatically lead to peace; freedom creates new terrains of conflict over the meaning of liberation.

When acrimonious debate over South Africa was at its height in 1986, no one predicted that within five years the ANC would call a halt to guerrilla war, the National party government would agree to repeal all apartheid legislation, and constitutional negotiations would begin. The situation five years from now may be equally unpredictable. But to understand how South Africans are likely to act in the future, past expectations of how South African would act should be compared with the present reality. Then what happens next will perhaps not come as a surprise. ∎

THE CHALLENGE TO THE U.S.

leading supporter of human rights, died in a suspicious auto accident. The United States had already announced it would freeze $5 million in military assistance to protest Moi's civil rights violations. It also gave refuge in the embassy to a promi-

nent Kenyan human rights lawyer. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded oil-rich Kuwait in August, 1990, the United States response to the invasion gave Kenya's port of Mombasa a renewed importance. Assistant Secretary Cohen rushed to Nairobi to mend fences. Within weeks the United States agreed to a $10-million food aid grant. This was the first time the United States had made such a grant to any African country, and many critics of the Moi regime felt that Washington was retreating from its policy of protesting civil rights violations because of strategic concerns.

A similar about-face occurred in United States relations with Marxist Ethiopia. For years, the United States had condemned President Mengistu Haile Mariam's human and civil rights violations. But the Persian Gulf crisis led Washington to view Mengistu as a bulwark against turmoil in the Arab world and as a protector of the vital Red Sea route leading to the Suez Canal. In December, 1990, the United States held its first talks with the Ethiopian regime since the Marxist coup nearly 26 years earlier. The United States also expressed willingness to work with the Soviet Union, Ethiopia's chief ally, to mediate the peace talks between Ethiopia and the Eritrean separatist guerrillas. ·

The administration sensed real progress in South Africa in the area of human and civil rights and was prepared to reward the government of President F. W. de Klerk for its policies aimed at national reconciliation. The Bush administration decided to work closely with the government and the African National Congress (ANC), thus spurning the weaker Pan-Africanist Congress, which drew its support from the Palestine Liberation Organization and had opposed negotiations with the government.

, In June, 1990, Nelson Mandela, the deputy president of the ANC, traveled to the United States and was warmly received by President Bush and by Congress. In September, President de Klerk became the first South African head of state to be received at the White House in nearly 45 years. South Africa had already repealed· more than 100 racially discriminatory laws, had released Mandela from prison after 27 years, and had granted amnesty to most exiled opponents of the state. In a speech before the South African Parliament in February, 1991, de Klerk vigorously reiterated his pledge to eliminate all apartheid laws, including the Group Areas Act and the Land Acts. The President and the State Department, convinced that the South African reforms are "irreversible," have intensified pressure on Congress to lift sanctions.

Assistant Secretary Cohen opposes sanctions and has launched a policy to encourage American businesses to work with black entrepreneurs in South Africa. American corporations, which since 1987 have spent more than $400 million in South Africa for health, education and housing for nonwhites, were urged not to disinvest. Even the mood in Congress has begun to shift. In April, 1990, legislation was signed by President Bush providing $10 million in aid for those organizations in South Africa that are committed to negotiating a transition to a nonracial democracy.

Namibia's independence in March, 1990, seemed to vindicate some aspects of former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker's policy of constructive engagement.* The Bush administration's paltry offer of $500,000 in assistance for Namibia angered Congress, which quickly raised aid to $10 million. Congressmen were impressed with the country's new constitution, which was hailed by international lawyers as one of the most democratic in the world and which provides for strong civil rights protection.

THE UNITED STATES ROLE

The United States is at a turning point in its relations with sub-Saharan Africa. European disengagement from the continent offers the United States a unique opportunity to develop its own independent, Africa-centered policies. It is in the long-term interest of the public and private sectors in the United States and in Africa to forge new partnerships. Moreover, the government and academic communities in the United States must end their own cold war and begin to forge more cooperative relationships.

The renewal of Africa must begin with the quest for food security. The United States must sharply increase its financing of food research and development in African educational institutions. Africans must be allowed to set their own research and development agendas, with infusions of foreign capital and technology.

Finally, aid projects must strengthen Africa's capacity to compete regionally and in the world economy. Debt cancellation and fresh public donor support may set the beleaguered continent on its feet again. But public and private sectors in the United States and in Africa must work quickly to rebuild Africa's centers of learning. Thus as the twenty-first century approaches, the challenge for the United States in Africa is to forge broader networks within and between institutions and individuals engaged in the development of human resources. Africa must be seen for its own value and not within the context of policy concerns in the United States or in other regions of the world. ∎

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*Editors note: For discussions of constructive engagement, see Pauline Baker, "United States Policy in Southern Africa," *Current History,* May, 1987, and Michael Clough, "United States Policy in Southern Africa," *Current History,* March, 1984.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of March, 1991, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

European Community (EC)
(See *U.S., Administration*)

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
March 30 — The Council's 6 member states — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — release a statement saying that the GCC is cutting off aid to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Jordan because they supported Iraq during the Persian Gulf war.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
March 15 — The Bank announces that it has approved a $250-million loan to Iran for earthquake reconstruction; this is the Bank's 1st loan to Iran since 1978.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
(See also *Intl, GCC*)

March 8 — In Algiers, an explosion in the offices of the Al Fatah faction of the PLO kills 2 Palestinians and critically injures 2 others; the Kach party, a right-wing Israeli group, says it sent a letter bomb to the offices in retaliation for the 1990 assassination of Kach leader Rabbi Meir Kahane.

Persian Gulf Crisis
(See also *Intl, GCC, UN; Japan; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 1 — The new U.S. ambassador to Kuwait, Edward Gnehm, reopens the U.S. embassy in Kuwait City.

March 3 — In Safwan, Iraq, near the Kuwaiti border, military commanders from the multinational coalition and from Iraq discuss conditions for a permanent cease-fire in the Persian Gulf war; a temporary cease-fire was called by U.S. President George Bush on February 27. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. forces in the Gulf, says at a news conference afterward that the 2 sides agreed to the release of all prisoners of war (POW's); coalition forces will continue to hold between 15 and 20 percent of Iraq's territory.

March 5 — The official Iraqi press agency announces that the ruling Revolutionary Command Council has "annulled the annexation of Kuwait" and has agreed to UN demands to return Kuwaiti assets.

The Iraqi government releases to the Red Cross in Baghdad 35 POW's from the multinational coalition; 15 of the POW's are American; yesterday it released 10 others, including 6 Americans; Baghdad Radio says that Iraq is not holding any more POW's.

March 6 — A Red Cross plane flies 294 freed Iraqi POW's from a camp in Saudi Arabia to Baghdad; more than 60,000 Iraqi troops are still being held prisoner by the multinational coalition.

March 7 — A convoy of buses carrying as many as 1,000 Kuwaitis released from Iraqi custody leaves southern Iraq for Kuwait. Non-Kuwaitis returning to Kuwait have been refused entry under the terms of martial law declared on February 28.

March 12 — The U.S. Defense Department reports that the number of U.S. troops killed in action in the Gulf war has

reached 125; 83 U.S. troops died in noncombat accidents during the war and 108 died accidentally before January 17; 330 were wounded in action, and 22 are listed as missing.

March 13 — President Bush says that Iraq's use of helicopter gunships against antigovernment rebels is a "violation" of the March 3 verbal agreement between coalition and Iraqi commanders.

March 22 — A U.S. F-15 warplane shoots down an Iraqi fighter-bomber flying from northern Iraq to an air base in central Iraq; on March 20, another Iraqi fighter-bomber was shot down by the U.S. The U.S. says the Iraqi planes were flying in violation of the March 3 cease-fire agreement.

In an interview in Washington, D.C., General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until a new Arab regional security force is ready to take over.

Southern Cone Common Market
March 26 — In Asunción, Paraguay, the Presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay agree to dismantle trade barriers between their countries and create the Southern Cone Common Market.

United Nations (UN)
(See also *Intl, Persian Gulf Crisis; South Africa; Sudan; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 21 — A UN team led by Under Secretary General Martti Ahtisaari that visited Iraq between March 10 and 17 issues its report on conditions in the country after the Persian Gulf war; the report says that bombing by the multinational coalition caused "near-apocalyptic" infrastructural damage; 9,000 houses were destroyed, 90 percent of industrial workers are unable to return to work and government food allocations have fallen by 61 percent. The report says that Iraq needs immediate supplies of food, fuel and generators, seeds and agricultural machinery, and equipment for water purification and sewage treatment in order to prevent famine and epidemics.

March 22 — The Security Council committee responsible for administering the UN trade embargo against Iraq says that it will automatically approve all requests to export to Iraq food and other critical goods unless a Council member objects.

Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact)
March 31 — The Warsaw Pact ceases to exist as a military alliance after Soviet army commanders formally relinquish control of the pact; the pact's dissolution was agreed to by the Soviet Union and the 6 East European member countries in Budapest February 25.

ALBANIA
(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 7 — The government imposes martial law in the port city of Durres and bars public assembly in Tirana and 2 other cities where there has been continued unrest; more than 7,000 Albanians are in Durres seeking to board ships bound for Italy; about 12,000 have fled to Italy in the past several days.

March 9 — Tirana radio reports that in Durres, police attempts to seize a ship that had been boarded by several thousand

Albanians seeking asylum in Italy resulted in the death of 4 people.

March 10 — More than 1,500 Albanians return to their country from Brindisi, Italy, after the Albanian government assures Italy that the returnees will not be persecuted.

ARGENTINA
(See *Intl, Southern Cone Common Market*)

BAHRAIN
(See *Intl, GCC; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

BANGLADESH

March 19 — Khaleda Zia, whose Bangladesh Nationalist party won parliamentary elections held on February 28, is named Prime Minister.

BENIN

Mar. 11 — Results of yesterday's presidential election show President Mathieu Kérékou has won 27 percent of the vote and Prime Minister Nicephore Soglo has won 36 percent; they face a runoff election on March 24.

March 24 — In the runoff election, Soglo wins 68 percent of the vote, becoming Benin's 1st popularly elected President.

BRAZIL
(See *Intl, Southern Cone Common Market*)

CANADA
(See *U.S., Administration, Foreign Policy*)

CHILE

March 5 — President Patricio Aylwin issues a report saying that more than 2,000 Chileans were killed by the secret police in the 1970's while the country was ruled by a military government under General Augusto Pinochet.

March 27 — Pinochet, who remains commander of Chile's armed forces, criticizes the government's human rights report as one-sided; he says the casualties that resulted from his 1973 coup were "unavoidable results of war."

CHINA
(See also *U.S., Administration*)

March 25 — Opening the annual session of the National People's Congress, Prime Minister Li Peng calls for central planning and orthodox Communism and for an increase in the military budget; he says that China must "continue to deepen [economic] reform and open China more widely to the outside world."

COLOMBIA

March 1 — After 23 years as a guerrilla group, the Popular Liberation Army (PLA), Colombia's largest active rebel organization, agrees to disarm in exchange for legal political status; 2 PLA representatives will join a 73-member convention that will rewrite the constitution.

EGYPT
(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

EL SALVADOR

March 1 — Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels attack the country's main hydroelectric plant in Chalatenango province, killing 17 government troops and injuring 16; 6 rebels are killed and 20 are injured in the attack.

March 6 — In an interview in Mexico City, Joaquín Villalobos, the commander of the FMLN, says the guerrilla group is no longer a Marxist movement; he says the FMLN's goals will not be achieved through revolution but through participation in "competitive" democracy.

March 22 — Results of legislative elections held March 10 show that the governing National Republican Alliance (ARENA) won 44.3 percent of the vote, giving it 39 seats in the National Assembly; the opposition Christian Democratic party won 28 percent, giving it 28 seats; and a leftist coalition, the Democratic Convergence, won 12 percent, giving it 10 seats.

FINLAND

March 17 — The ruling Social Democratic party loses its majority in Parliament after the opposition Center party wins today's general elections; the Center party now has 55 seats, the Social Democrats, 48 seats.

GERMANY
(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

March 15 — *The New York Times* reports that Erich Honecker, the former Prime Minister of East Germany, was moved on March 12 from a Soviet-managed hospital in Berlin to a hospital in the Soviet Union; Chancellor Helmut Kohl demands Honecker's return to face charges for crimes he allegedly committed while in office.

INDIA

March 5 — The Congress party walks out of Parliament in response to reports that party head and former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is under surveillance by agents of the Haryana state government.

March 6 — The government of Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar resigns and calls for elections; Shekhar says his government did not authorize the surveillance of Gandhi.

March 13 — Shekhar resigns as Prime Minister; President Ramaswami Venkataraman then dissolves Parliament. Elections are expected to be held in May.

IRAN
(See also *Intl, World Bank*)

March 27 — In an interview in *Der Spiegel,* President Hashemi Rafsanjani denies that Iran has provided troops, arms or other military assistance to Iraqi opposition groups or that Iranians are fighting alongside Iraqi rebels; he says Iran has provided only humanitarian aid to Iraqi refugees.

IRAQ
(See also *Intl, GCC, Persian Gulf Crisis, UN; Iran;
U.K., Great Britain; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 4 — In Basra, Iraq's 2d largest city, and several other cities, supporters and opponents of Saddam Hussein clash in the most serious civil unrest since he became President in 1979; demobilized soldiers have reportedly joined Shiite Muslim fundamentalists in efforts to bring down the government.

March 5 — Loyalist Republican Guards reportedly retake control of Basra.

March 6 — Saddam appoints his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, interior minister, making him responsible for internal security; Hassan oversaw the occupation of Kuwait and reportedly used chemical weapons against members of Iraq's Kurdish minority in 1988.

March 13 — Teheran radio reports that massive street protests are taking place in Baghdad and that there have been clashes between loyalists and protesters; the radio station also reports that there is fighting between loyalists and rebels in Basra and in 4 cities in northern Iraq.

Ending a 3-day meeting in Beirut, Lebanon, leaders of 23 Iraqi opposition groups agree to establish a joint leadership

aimed at the overthrow of Saddam's government.

March 14 — Kurdish rebels claim control of parts of northern Iraq.

March 16 — In a radio broadcast, Saddam promises that he will institute democratic reforms, including a multiparty system, and that a referendum on a new constitution will be held after the uprising against him has been put down; he claims that loyalist forces have defeated rebels in the south but admits that unrest continues in Kurdish areas in the north.

March 19 — Arab diplomats and Kuwaiti officials in Kuwait say that Iran has been arming and organizing guerrillas in southern Iraq to topple Saddam and replace him with a sympathetic Shiite Muslim leader.

March 23 — Saddam reshuffles his Cabinet, appointing Saadun Hamadi, a Shiite Muslim, Prime Minister; Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz becomes one of two Deputy Prime Ministers.

March 28 — Hojatolislam Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim, the leader of the Shiite Muslim forces fighting for control of southern Iraq, concedes in an interview that loyalist forces have retaken control of Karbala and other towns in southern Iraq.

March 31 — The government says its forces have retaken Dohuk and 2 other towns in northern Iraq from Kurdish rebels.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, PLO; Lebanon; U.S., Foreign Policy, Legislation*)

March 10 — In West Jerusalem, a Palestinian from the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip stabs 4 Israeli women to death and injures at least 1 other woman; the attacker says he was sending a message to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker 3d, who is due to arrive in Israel tomorrow.

March 11 — Shortly before Baker's arrival, 6 heavily armed Arab guerrillas cross the border from Jordan into Israel; the guerrillas are killed by Israeli troops during a 2-hour gun battle.

March 17 — The government permits some 30,000 Palestinian workers living in the occupied territories to return to their jobs in Tel Aviv and Haifa; the government prohibited Palestinians from entering Israel after the Persian Gulf war began January 17.

March 24 — In reaction to the stabbings in West Jerusalem on March 10 and to other incidents, the military issues deportation orders against 4 Palestinians from Gaza; they are accused of directing and participating in violence against Israel, but are not accused of involvement in the recent attacks on Israelis.

ITALY

(See also *Albania*)

March 29 — Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, the head of the Christian Democratic party, resigns after losing the support of Bettino Craxi, the leader of the Socialist party and a partner in the 5-party ruling coalition.

JAPAN

(See also *U.S., Administration*)

March 6 — The Diet approves $9 billion in aid to the multinational force to help pay for the nonmilitary expenses of the Persian Gulf war.

March 20 — Government officials order the shutdown of a 2d nuclear power plant after an inspection reveals maintenance flaws similar to those suspected of leading to the release of radiation from the Mihama nuclear power plant on February 11.

JORDAN

(See *Intl, GCC*)

KOREA, SOUTH

(See also *U.S., Administration*)

March 27 — The ruling Democratic Liberal party wins more than half the local council posts in South Korea's 1st local elections in 30 years, which were held yesterday; opposition leader Kim Dae Jong's Party for Peace and Democracy wins 18 percent of the posts.

KUWAIT

(See also *Intl, GCC, Persian Gulf Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 3 — Kuwaiti soldiers block off streets in Kuwait City to search for collaborators with Iraq and weapons; their search is concentrated in areas populated mostly by Palestinians.

March 4 — The Crown Prince, Sheik Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah, returns to Kuwait to take up his post as martial law administrator and Prime Minister; he says that martial law may be extended beyond 3 months and that it is too early to schedule a parliamentary election because of the current instability in Kuwait.

March 14 — The Emir, Sheik Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, returns to Kuwait.

March 20 — Planning Minister Suleiman al-Mutawa announces that Crown Prince Saad submitted the Cabinet's resignation to the Emir yesterday, saying that the Cabinet was not able to restore necessary services; the Cabinet will remain as caretaker until a new government is formed.

March 22 — In defiance of martial law, opposition groups rally in Kuwait City to demand that the government press for the recovery of Kuwaiti prisoners of war.

LAOS

March 29 — The official radio reports that Kaysone Phomvihane has been reelected secretary general of the Communist party and head of its Politburo; the other longtime Communist party veterans have been dropped from the Politburo.

LEBANON

March 3 — Israeli jets attack a Palestinian guerrilla base at Rumin in southern Lebanon, injuring 4 people.

March 15 — Lebanese police report that Israeli jets destroyed 2 Palestinian bases in the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon today; 7 people were injured in the attacks.

March 19 — Israeli fighter-bombers attack a Palestinian guerrilla base south of Sidon; 14 people are injured.

MALI

March 22 — President Moussa Traoré declares a state of emergency after at least 30 people are reported killed in Bamako when antigovernment protests demanding an end to one-party rule become violent.

March 24 — Soldiers shoot antigovernment demonstrators in Bamako; 34 people are reported to have been killed; opposition leaders call for a general strike beginning March 25 to force Traoré to resign and to demand a national conference to end one-party rule.

March 25 — The government ends the state of emergency, releases hundreds of political prisoners and withdraws its troops from Bamako.

March 26 — A coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré ousts Traoré; at least 59 people are reported killed in the coup; Touré says the army will not "meddle in politics" and will return to its barracks after establishing "social justice and total democracy."

MEXICO

(See *U.S., Administration*)

NICARAGUA

March 4 — President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro presents a new economic stabilization program; the plan replaces the official unit of currency, the córdoba, with the so-called gold córdoba, and devalues the gold córdoba from parity with the U.S. dollar to 5 to the dollar.

March 5 — Minister of Government Carlos Hurtado says that a Sandinista army veteran, Bayardo Castro Mendoza, has been detained as a suspect in the February 16 killing of Enrique Bermudez, the former military commander of the U.S.-supported contra rebels.

OMAN

(See *Intl, GCC; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

PARAGUAY

(See *Intl, Southern Cone Common Market*)

PHILIPPINES

March 21 — President Corazon Aquino says that Imelda Marcos, the widow of former President Ferdinand Marcos, may return to the Philippines but will face charges that she and her husband stole as much as $10 billion during his 20 years as President.

POLAND

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 7 — President Lech Walesa urges the Parliament to dissolve itself and allow immediate free elections because it is dominated by former Communists; elections are not required until 1993.

QATAR

(See *Intl, GCC; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

RWANDA

March 30 — The government signs a· cease-fire agreement in Brussels with rebels who have been trying to overthrow it since October, 1990; President Juvénal Habyarimana must release political detainees and prisoners of war before talks can begin on a permanent peace settlement.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See *Intl, GCC, Persian Gulf Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

SOUTH AFRICA

March 4 — The United Democratic Front (UDF), a coalition of about 700 anti-apartheid groups that was formed in 1983, announces that it will disband on August 20.

March 9 — Clashes in Alexandra between supporters of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom party leave 7 people dead and at least 28 injured; police, reinforced by army units, are sent to restore order.

March 12 — President F.W. de Klerk introduces legislation to repeal the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, the Group Areas Act of 1966, and the Black Communities Development Act of 1984; these laws institutionalized racial discrimination in residence and land ownership.

March 21 — Foreign Minister Roelof Botha announces that the government will permit the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to assist in the return of political exiles to South Africa.

March 24 — In Daveyton, east of Johannesburg, police clash with ANC supporters at an outdoor rally; 12 people are killed and 29 injured.

March 27 — Gunmen believed to belong to the Inkatha Freedom party raid a funeral vigil in Alexandra, killing 15 of the mourners and injuring at least 16.

March 30 — ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela and In-

katha leader Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi meet in Durban; they agree to cooperate more closely to end the violence between supporters of their organizations.

SRI LANKA

March 2 — In Colombo, a car bomb explodes, killing Deputy Defense Minister Ranjan Wijeratne and at least 18 others; Wijeratne was the leader of the government campaign to quell the Tamil separatist insurgency; no one claims responsibility for the attack.

SUDAN

March 18 — UN officials report that the Sudanese government has agreed to permit famine relief efforts to proceed; the government suspended international relief programs to the south in 1990.

SYRIA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

THAILAND

March 1 — King Bhumipol Adulyadej gives his approval for an interim constitution to the military leaders who seized power on February 28.

March 7 — The military installs an interim government made up of civilians; Anand Panyarachun, a former ambassador to the U.S., is named Prime Minister.

March 10 — After 2 weeks in detention, ousted Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan is released; he resigns as leader of the Chart Thai party.

TOGO

March 16 — For a 2d day, police clash with thousands of anti-government protesters in Lomé.

March 19 — The government agrees to opposition demands for amnesty for dissidents and for the institution of a multiparty system.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Warsaw Pact*)

March 4 — In Latvia, results from yesterday's plebiscite on independence show that 74 percent of the voters, including many ethnic Russians, support independence.

In a plebiscite on independence held in Estonia yesterday, 78 percent of the voters support independence; a large proportion of ethnic Russians are among the supporters.

The Congress of People's Deputies ratifies the 6-nation treaty on German unification, formally ending post-World War II allied occupation rights in Germany; the Soviet Union is the last nation to ratify the treaty.

March 6 — Vice President Gennadi Yanayev reports that in the southern Ossetian region of the Georgian republic, 37 people have been killed and 150 injured in clashes between Ossetians and Georgians.

March 8 — *The New York Times* reports that a strike by coal miners in Kazakhstan that began March 1 has spread to all the major coal-mining regions in the Soviet Union and involves as many as 100,000 miners; the leader of the coal miners union, Pavel Shushpanov, says his members want President Mikhail Gorbachev to relinquish power to the republics.

March 10 — In Moscow, more than 100,000 demonstrators demand that Gorbachev resign and urge voters to reject the union treaty in the March 17 referendum on Soviet unity.

March 18 — Results of yesterday's referendum show that 76 percent of the voters support Gorbachev's treaty to maintain the existing Soviet Union; 6 of the 15 republics boycotted the balloting.

March 25 — Gorbachev bans all public rallies and demonstrations in Moscow until April 15; a rally is planned for March 27 to show support for Gorbachev's rival, Russian republic president Boris Yeltsin; during the ban, price increases of up to 300 percent are to be introduced.

March 26 — Gorbachev orders the Interior Ministry to take over law enforcement in Moscow from the democratically elected city government.

March 28 — In Moscow, more than 100,000 people rally to show support for Yeltsin; police and security troops are stationed to enforce the ban on public demonstrations, but the rally proceeds without incident.

At a special session of the Russian parliament that has been called by Communist deputies to censure Yeltsin, the majority of deputies votes that the ban on demonstrations and Gorbachev's assumption of control over Moscow's police are illegal.

March 29 — Continuing its special session, the Russian parliament votes to disregard support for a popularly elected republic president; whether or not such a post should be created was one of the questions presented to Russian voters in the March 17 referendum.

March 30 — A message from the striking coal miners is read in the Russian parliament; the miners demand that the parliament permit free elections for a president; they say they will continue to strike until their demands are met.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)
(See *Intl, GCC; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain
(See also *U.S., Administration*)

March 6 — The Defense Ministry says that the government has freed 32 Iraqis it held as prisoners of war (POW's) near Salisbury; the POW's were all students at British colleges and universities when they were detained in January.

March 14 — A court of appeals releases from prison a group of 6 Northern Irish defendants, known as the Birmingham Six, after prosecutors admit the evidence used to convict them has been discredited; in 1974, the Birmingham Six were found guilty of an Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing of 2 Birmingham pubs and sentenced to life imprisonment.

March 21 — Environment Secretary Michael Heseltine announces that the government will abolish the per capita tax instituted by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1989.

Northern Ireland

March 25 — For the 1st time in 15 years, leaders of the parties that represent the majority of Northern Ireland's Protestants and Roman Catholics agree to participate in formal negotiations on restoring most aspects of home rule in Northern Ireland; representatives of the Irish Republic will also participate in the talks, which are expected to begin in May.

UNITED STATES

Administration

March 1 — President George Bush asks Congress to grant him a 2-year extension of "fast-track" authority, which expires May 31; in granting the authority, Congress waives its right to amend trade pacts and must simply approve or reject them. President Bush wants the extension in order to negotiate an international trade agreement, a trade agreement with Mexico and Canada, and trade agreements with other Latin American countries.

March 11 — Transportation Secretary Samuel Skinner announces an air travel accord with Great Britain. U.S.-based

United Airlines and American Airlines will be permitted to purchase routes to London's Heathrow Airport from ailing Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) and Trans World Airlines (TWA), respectively; British carriers are granted the right to a limited number of flights from the U.S. to other countries in Europe and to connecting flights from the U.S. to other countries.

March 12 — The Exxon Corporation agrees to a settlement of lawsuits brought against it by the U.S. government and Alaska after its tanker the *Exxon Valdez* spilled 11 million gallons of oil off the Alaskan coast in March, 1989. Exxon will plead guilty to 4 misdemeanor charges, will pay a $100-million fine to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and will remit $1.1 billion over 10 years to a fund to restore and improve Alaska's Prince William Sound.

March 29 — The 6th annual report on foreign trade barriers, prepared by U.S. trade representative Carla Hills, finds fewer trade barriers in Japan in 1991 than in 1990 but more barriers in the European Community (EC), Canada, Mexico and South Korea.

Civil Rights

March 15 — Attorney General Dick Thornburgh announces that the Justice Department will review all complaints of police brutality received by the U.S. government during the past 6 years; questions about police discipline and training were raised by members of Congress after a videotape of the March 3 beating of a black motorist by Los Angeles police officers was televised nationally.

Economy

March 3 — The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators fell 0.4 percent in January, the 6th straight monthly decline.

March 8 — The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate rose to 6.5 percent in February, from 6.2 percent in January.

March 19 — The consumer price index rose 0.2 percent in February, the Labor Department reports.

March 20 — The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit for January was $7 billion.

March 27 — The Commerce Department announces a revision of its figure for the gross national product (GNP) for the 4th quarter of 1990; GNP fell at an annual rate of 1.6 percent rather than the 2 percent rate reported in February.

March 29 — The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 1.1 percent in February, the 1st advance since June, 1990.

Foreign Policy
(See also *Intl, Persian Gulf Crisis; Israel*)

March 6 — Addressing a joint session of Congress at the end of the Persian Gulf war, President Bush outlines "the four key challenges" that he says the U.S. and the other countries of the multinational coalition must help the Middle East meet: the creation of a security arrangement maintained by U.S. allies in the region; "an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict," to be effected by Israel's release of occupied land in exchange for Israel's recognition by Arab states; arms control for nonconventional weapons; and economic development.

March 10 — Foreign ministers from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates meet with Secretary of State James Baker 3d in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; the group issues a statement supporting President Bush's 4-point plan for the Middle East proposed March 6; Baker says that the ministers have agreed to an Arab peacekeeping force in the Gulf made up of troops from their 8 countries.

March 11 — The Commerce Department makes public a list of

sales to the government and private companies in Iraq that it approved from 1985 until Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August, 1989; the sales involved $500-million worth of sophisticated manufactured goods like computers and lasers; some of the recipients have been identified as centers for nuclear- and chemical-weapons research.

March 12 — Baker concludes a 2-day visit to Israel, during which he held talks with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Defense Minister Moshe Arens, urging them not to rule out exchanging land for peace under UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; he meets with Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip who are not members of the PLO, including Mayor Elias Freij of Bethlehem.

March 15 — In Washington, D.C., the U.S. and Albania sign an agreement restoring diplomatic relations, which were severed by the U.S. in 1939 after Italy invaded Albania.

March 20 — President Bush receives Polish President Lech Walesa at the White House; the President forgives $800 million of Poland's debt to the U.S. government, reducing the amount Poland owes by 20 percent.

The U.S. ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that a transcript of her July 25, 1990, meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, made public by the Iraqi government on September 11, was "disinformation"; the Iraqi version, she says, distorted what was actually said and omitted her strongly worded warnings to Saddam about the use of force against Kuwait.

Trade representative Hills and Canadian Trade Minister John Crosbie announce that the U.S. and Canada are accelerating the removal of tariffs on products involving $2-billion worth of bilateral trade annually; in a free trade agreement that went into effect January 1, 1989, the 2 countries promised to lift almost all trade barriers between them by the year 2000.

Legislation

March 7 — The Senate confirms, 99 to 0, Representative Edward Madigan (R., Ill.) as secretary of agriculture, replacing Clayton Yeutter.

March 14 — The Senate unanimously confirms Lamar Alexander, the former governor of Tennessee, as secretary of education.

March 21 — The House approves, 225 to 188, a compromise bill adopted by voice vote yesterday in the Senate that appropriates $30 billion for the savings and loan industry bailout.

The Senate, in an 88-12 vote, confirms former Florida Governor Bob Martinez as the country's director of national drug control policy.

March 22 — The House and Senate pass compromise appropriations bills authorizing $15 billion for the Gulf war if contributions from U.S. allies prove insufficient and a $5.2-billion bill covering expanded veterans benefits. Both carry by voice vote in the Senate; the House votes are 379-11 and 340-48. Both bills also direct the Department of Defense to proceed with a $988-million contract for the modernization of 12 F-14 aircraft by the Grumman Corporation, which the department announced in February that it would cancel.

March 23 — President Bush signs the $30-billion savings and loan bailout bill.

Military

March 29 — Two sailors serving aboard an aircraft carrier based in the Philippines are ordered to face a court martial on charges of urging a mutiny aboard their ship during the Persian Gulf war; the sailors, who are Muslims, deny the charges.

Science and Space

March 21 — The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) sends to Congress plans for a simplified space station to cost $30 billion, $8.3 billion less than the previous design, and to be ready for occupancy by a 4-member crew by September, 1999.

Supreme Court

March 4 — The Court rules, 7 to 1, that large punitive damage awards by juries in personal injury and product liability lawsuits do not necessarily violate the "due process" clause of the Constitution.

March 20 — The Court rules that employers may not exclude women from jobs in which exposure to toxic substances could damage a developing fetus; the Court finds that "fetal protection" policies like the one applied to women regardless of their age or plans for child-bearing are in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment, and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.

March 26 — The Court rules, 5 to 4, that the use of a coerced confession in a criminal trial does not necessarily invalidate a conviction, if other evidence is sufficient to convict; use of such a confession can be considered a "harmless error."

In a 6-3 decision, the Court rules that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply to American workers at the overseas plants of U.S.-based companies.

March 27 — Overturning a 1987 decision of a federal appeals court in Denver, the Court rules unanimously that copyright protection does not extend to the alphabetized listings in the white pages of a telephone directory.

URUGUAY
(See *Intl, Southern Cone Common Market*)

YUGOSLAVIA

March 2 — After reports of violent clashes between Serbian villagers and Croatian security forces, Borisav Jovic, the leader of the collective presidency, orders federal army troops to the Croatian village of Pakrac; Belgrade radio reports that at least 6 people have been killed.

March 9 — In Belgrade, thousands of demonstrators demand that directors of a television station be fired for carrying pro-Communist news programs and that Slobodan Milosevic, a former Communist who is Serbia's president, be ousted; in clashes between police and the protesters, 2 people are killed and at least 26 are injured.

March 12 — After 3 days of anti-Communist protest in Belgrade, the Serbian republic government agrees to some of the protesters' demands.

March 13 — In Belgrade, tens of thousands of anti-Communist demonstrators continue to call for Milosevic to resign from the presidency.

March 15 — Jovic resigns after the collective presidency rejects his proposal to grant the army emergency authority to intervene in ethnic clashes; Vice President Stipe Mesic becomes acting President.

March 16 — Milosevic declares that he is refusing to recognize the authority of the collective presidency; with this act he effectively declares Serbia's secession from the Yugoslav federation.

March 17 — Milosevic proclaims Krajina, a port in Croatia, a "Serbian autonomous region"; 200,000 ethnic Serbs live in Krajina.

March 19 — The Yugoslav People's Army says that it will not "interfere in political talks on [Yugoslavia's] future," but it will not "allow interethnic conflicts and civil war."

March 20 — The parliament of the Serbian republic persuades Jovic to withdraw his resignation from the collective presidency; Milosevic agrees to attend a special session of the collective presidency on March 21, ostensibly reversing his defiance of the executive body's authority. ■

Nations of Africa

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